

CURRENT HISTORY

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The Middle East, 1982

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
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In 1982, the nations of the Middle East face continuing instability; their domestic and foreign policies and the policies of the United States are in flux. As our introductory article on American foreign policy in the area points out, "The apparent reversal of the American position on the Saudi Arabian peace plan . . . suggests that the United States is now committed to supporting a Pax Saudiana in the Middle East."

United States Policy in the Middle East: Toward a Pax Saudiana

BY LEONARD BINDER

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NO region preoccupied the United States government more than the Middle East during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. The Camp David accords were said to be Jimmy Carter's greatest foreign policy success, while the Iranian seizure of American hostages distracted his administration for more than 14 months. Nevertheless, the then-not-quite-impending Israeli elections and the long stalemate in the United States-Iran negotiations provided a double excuse for a virtual paralysis of policy during the last year of the Carter administration. This paralysis and the political sensitivity that surrounded it were evident in the absence of serious debate on Middle East policy during the 1980 presidential election campaign.

The incoming administration of Ronald Reagan was convinced that President Carter's policies had gravely weakened the United States international position by allowing the Soviet Union to gain a strategic advantage in weapons, by subordinating American competition with the Soviet Union to the resolution of secondary regional issues, and by subordinating tactical realism to the impracticalities of declaratory and admonitory idealism. Toward the end of his administration, it appeared that President Carter himself realized the folly of his earlier position, so he authorized the abortive rescue mission against Iran; in what has come to be called the "Carter Doctrine," he enunciated the intention of the United States to use military force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf; and he proposed the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (Awacs) planes and an enhancement package for the F-15's to Saudi Arabia. Under President Carter, an effort was also made to

obtain permission to use bases in Saudi Arabia.

The Defense Department has increased its influence over United States foreign policy under President Reagan, but even during the Carter administration it seems to have been generally agreed that our position and our interests in the Middle East required military support that could be available on very short notice. Although the United States was able to persuade Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to grant it access to a base at Ras Banas, and although it was able to obtain similar facilities in the Sudan, Oman and Somalia, it met with a general reluctance to grant permanent bases, and it encountered a particularly decisive negative from Saudi Arabia. Hence, the dilemma facing the Reagan administration was largely inherited from its predecessor. President Carter's promise to use force in the Gulf was ridiculed as an empty statement in the absence of an American military presence. The prize to be protected was the Saudi petroleum complex; but the Saudis believe that granting bases would greatly enhance the risk to internal security.

The new administration invited criticism of its Middle East policy because of the fragmentary character of its first pronouncements, which emphasized the imminence and the severity of the Soviet threat to the Middle East while suggesting that the many and complex disputes among the Middle Eastern states were neither urgent nor important. In an apparent effort to win support for a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union, American officials indicated that the Middle East was comprised of two groups of countries; those friendly to ourselves and those friendly to the Soviet Union. Libya, Syria and the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) were singled out for criticism. Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were praised in varying degrees. The greatest importance was placed on the defense of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was condemned, and military assistance was offered to Pakistan. As little as possible was said about Iran and Iraq and Turkey and Greece.

On the Palestine question, the administration remained committed to the Camp David peace process. The most important American priority was to acquire military bases or some form of military access to Saudi Arabia. The administration presumed that a military arrangement with Saudi Arabia aimed primarily at threats from the east and north could reasonably be detached from other Middle East problems. If Israeli apprehensions were aroused, they could most likely be calmed by allowing the Israelis a relatively free hand on the West Bank and in south Lebanon.

It was, in fact, in Lebanon that the fanciful dualism of American policy came up against the harsh complexities of Middle Eastern politics. During his 1981 visit to Israel, Secretary of State Alexander Haig made remarks that were so critical of Syria that Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin was led to believe that the United States would not object to a substantial rearrangement of political and military forces in Lebanon. The Maronite Phalangists precipitated the crisis by attempting to expand their control to the strategic city of Zahlé. For their part, the Syrians overreacted, driving the Maronites from the Sannine ridge after successfully securing the approaches to Zahlé and therewith their land links to Damascus. Begin then exploited the situation for his own benefit, ordering the Israeli air force to fire on the Syrian helicopters attacking the Maronites. The tension between Israel and Syria escalated, and the United States was belatedly compelled to consider the consequences of Israeli-Syrian hostilities on the Camp David process, on the situation in Lebanon, on the posture of Saudi Arabia, and on American policy in view of American commitments to Israel.

The situation was brought under tenuous control by persuading the Saudis to arrange for Lebanese forces to replace the Maronite militia in Zahlé and by pressuring the Israelis to refrain from attacking the newly emplaced Syrian missiles. The Israelis were bitterly disappointed, having been encouraged into an adventure only to be forced to accept a severe weakening of their position in south Lebanon. The American effort to defuse the situation concentrated on the shuttle mission of former Ambassador Philip Habib, who succeeded in bringing Saudi influence to bear on Syria and the PLO. While that crisis is in abeyance and not "officially" solved, at this moment the United States has tacitly endorsed the continued emplacement of Syrian missiles in Lebanon; it has condemned

the Israeli bombing attack on the Fakehaneh quarter of Beirut where the PLO headquarters is said to be; it has supported the cease-fire between the Israelis and the PLO; and it has acquiesced in the military build-up of the PLO forces in south Lebanon.

During the tense unfolding of the Lebanese crisis of 1981, the United States began to shift its attention from the more hypothetical concern with the Soviet threat to the intricate perils of regional conflicts. It became apparent that most Middle East governments, including our closest allies, did not consider the Soviet menace to be either immediate or direct.

In the course of his shuttle diplomacy, Philip Habib was able to demonstrate the potentiality of Saudi influence with the Syrian government and the PLO leadership. The Carter policy had been based on the temporary coincidence of American and Syrian interests in preventing a Palestinian military success early in 1976. Syrian President Hafiz Asad's readiness to use force to control the PLO impressed President Carter and inspired the hope that Syria might be converted from a Soviet client into an American client. That hope has not been translated into effective policy because we have been unwilling to pay the Syrian price, but the United States has consistently avoided a decisive alienation of Damascus by eschewing the proposal of any solution to the Lebanese situation and by refusing to support anyone else's proposals.

The key components of United States policy under Carter were the consistent American refusal to support any move to strengthen Lebanese President Elias Sarkis's regime at the expense of Syrian influence and the continuous criticism of the Israeli role in south Lebanon. The United States viewed the Syrians, rather than the Maronites or the Israelis or the Lebanese government forces, as the proper and most effective restraint on the Palestinians. Cooperation with the Saudis is not likely to change this policy. It is significant that, after the cease-fire was established, a rumored Saudi plan for a Lebanese solution surfaced in a context of favorable comment. That solution would separate Israeli and Palestinian forces, restrict Syrian forces to the Bekaa and enhance the role of the Lebanese army, but it would still fall far short of establishing the sovereignty of the Lebanese state. The plan is meant to weaken Syrian influence while strengthening Saudi leverage and bringing the Maronites into the game once more. Unfortunately, the Lebanese state cannot be restored without powerful international support, i.e., from the United States as well as from Saudi Arabia. The rumored Lebanese "solution" sidesteps the issue of Lebanese sovereignty. It would only try to bring both the Palestinians and the Phalangist Maronites into a single, nonviolent political arena in which Syrian and Saudi and possibly American influence could become continuing rather than episodic factors.

The proposed return to the status quo ante in Lebanon leaves an already unstable situation just that much less stable, and it does not begin to cope with the oncoming problem of the Lebanese presidential elections. Unless some sort of sovereign autonomy is restored to Lebanon, it is doubtful that the election can be held or that its outcome will carry any political weight. Without the restoration of Lebanese sovereign authority, there will be no ordered arena in which Saudi and American influence can be effective. Unless the Beirut government is strengthened, it is unlikely that the Israelis will relinquish their remaining position in south Lebanon. On the other hand, if the Israelis are forced by the United States to withdraw as balancers in the Lebanese political system, they will become even more reluctant to implement a meaningful program of political autonomy on the West Bank and in Gaza, or to reconsider their position on the Golan Heights. Under such circumstances, regional accommodation is becoming more difficult to achieve, and the sale of sophisticated aircraft and intelligence-gathering devices to Saudi Arabia appears increasingly to be a mortal threat to an embattled Beirut government.

AN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE

As it emerges from the obscurity of the long waiting period of the Israeli elections and the Lebanese crisis, American policy is still directed at establishing a strong military presence in the Persian Gulf to protect petroleum supplies and to minimize the political repercussions of the Iranian revolution. This central policy goal is thought to be attainable only through the establishment of close ties with Saudi Arabia, and such close ties are conditioned on American support for the present Saudi regime. Obviously, the United States cannot provide for the ideological legitimization of the Islamic Saudi regime, but it can help provide the regional-international conditions most conducive to the survival of the Saudi regime and the prospering of its elite. The lesson of Iran is being applied not in the sense that the United States should have been less identified with the Shah, but that it should have been even more committed.

Thus the Defense Department hopes that Saudi Arabia will be able to fill part of the vacuum left by the demise of the Shah's regime. While no one believes that Saudi Arabia can be a strong military power in its own right, it is believed that the Saudi military role can be important if it is linked to a strategic and logistical network including Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Somalia and Israel, along with a significant American military presence in the Gulf.

It is difficult to avoid the sense that this elaborate structure rests on a relatively weak base. Saudi Arabia is the point of the inverted pyramid. A domestic upheaval might destroy the whole structure, although

Saudi Arabia has a much smaller and far more easily controlled population than Iran. The present government might have to rely on foreign forces to suppress militant opposition, a prospect that is thoroughly distasteful to the ruling family. On the other hand, there is no miraculous solution to the vulnerability of the Saudi regime, and it is with this in mind that the United States has responded affirmatively to the urgings of those who have long advocated a policy of making the Middle East safe for Saudi Arabia. For their part, the Saudis have gone along to the extent of agreeing to play a moderating role in Lebanon and denying that they are seeking the destruction of Israel. There are, however, clear limits beyond which the Saudis will not go, and these include concessions on Jerusalem and acceptance of the Camp David framework.

In order to make the Middle East safe for Saudi Arabia, the Saudi regime must appear to be strongly Islamic as well as Arab nationalist. It must appear to be independent and concerned with the material well-being of Muslims throughout the world. The legitimacy of the Saudi regime is tied to the symbolism of national and religious intransigence on Jerusalem and unstinting support for the Palestinian movement. In addition, the personal reputation of the princely Saudi leaders for wisdom, prudence, forbearance, piety, courage and sincerity must be established.

The Awacs deal has, unfortunately, become a test of the influence of the Saudi leadership over the United States and of the commitment of the United States to the Saudi regime. It is no longer a question of the sense of arming Saudi Arabia to the teeth. The question of how the Saudis might use these weapons has also become secondary. The argument that the Awacs deal was a prerequisite to the establishment of an American military presence in Saudi Arabia has also been dropped. It is, in fact, highly unlikely that American forces will be stationed at bases in Saudi Arabia because such an arrangement would probably weaken the legitimacy of the Saudi regime. Once the Saudis have the Awacs, if they ever do, they will try to figure out what to do with them, while the Israelis will make serious plans to destroy them.

As a consequence, first, of events in Lebanon and then of the approval of the Awacs sale to Saudi Arabia, American-Israeli rapport began to deteriorate and American-Saudi relations improved. Although the Israelis openly opposed the sale, they did not expect to be able to block the sale nor did they think it wise to go head to head against the President in the United States Senate. In the event, the opposition to the Awacs sale got away from both the President's men and the Israeli lobby. The Israelis were still reeling from a series of political setbacks and were seeking compensatory gains rather than a retaliatory strike against the administration. Israel was unable to

call off its own lobby and it was not satisfied with the American version of the first installment of strategic cooperation as a payoff for Israeli acquiescence in the Awacs deal. The Israelis want a full scale military alliance, while the Reagan administration is only offering to stockpile defensive and non-lethal supplies in Israel. The strength of the American opposition to the deal in the Senate may have surprised the Israelis as much as the administration, but that opposition could be attributed, in part, to the difficulty faced by Senators in suspending their disbelief. They doubted the military capacity of Saudi Arabia, the political effectiveness of the dynastic regime, and, above all, the ability of the Saudi elite to produce solutions to the Lebanese, the Palestinian, the Iraqi-Syrian, and the Yemeni disputes. From the administration's point of view, which was strengthened by the advice of corporate and diplomatic leaders with the greatest experience and investment in Saudi Arabia, the Awacs sale is more important for building Saudi prestige and increasing its ability to influence its neighbors than it is for the military security it will provide.

The Awacs sale itself was turned into a dramatic personal triumph for the President, making it all the more significant that the heated public debate included some surprisingly harsh and intimidating language directed against Menachem Begin, the Israeli lobby, and the American-Jewish community. These statements have had a negative impact on United States-Israeli relations. Friction between the United States and Israel was subsequently enhanced by the United States decision to lend a modicum of support to the peace plan first proposed by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd in August, 1981. At the time, the plan was calculated to diminish the effectiveness of President Sadat's efforts to win American support for the Egyptian position. The United States showed no great enthusiasm for the Fahd plan at that time. The apparent reversal of the American position on the Saudi Arabian peace plan, coming on the heels of the confirmation of the Awacs sale and in anticipation of the Arab League summit meeting in November, 1981, in Morocco, suggests that the United States is now committed to supporting a *Pax Saudiana* in the Middle East. Given the fact that this plan is first to be discussed in a forum from which both Israel and Egypt will be barred, it indicates the administration's intent to glide away from the Camp David framework. (For excerpts from the accords, see *Current History*, January, 1979, p. 31.)

The administration argues that it sees no reason why the two peace plans cannot be brought into some accommodative arrangement, but the Saudis and the other Arab states insist on the substitution of their plan for the Camp David formula. Under the circumstances, it is important to avoid breaking off the Camp David process before it is completed and before the

TEXT OF SAUDI ARABIA'S PEACE PLAN, 1981

1. Israeli evacuation of all Arab territories seized during the 1967 Middle East war, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem.
2. Dismantling the settlements set up by Israel on the occupied lands after the 1967 war.
3. Guaranteeing freedom of religious practices for all religions in the Jerusalem holy shrines.
4. Asserting the rights of the Palestinian people and compensating those Palestinians who do not wish to return to their homeland.
5. Commencing a transitional period in the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under United Nations supervision for a duration not exceeding a few months.
6. Setting up a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace.
8. Guaranteeing the implementation of these principles by the United Nations or some of its member states.

two sides have received their respective payoffs, lest the Sinai border once again become the most dangerous flashpoint in the Middle East. It may be apparent that the Camp David accords have not and will not provide for a comprehensive solution, but a program that starts with the abrogation of those accords is probably doomed from the start. Such a program will have an especially inauspicious beginning if it leads the United States to choose between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while scaring the wits out of Israel.

The assassination of President Sadat sent a tremor of panic through Washington. Superficial parallels were drawn with the Iranian revolution and projected onto the Saudi regime. Since the assassination took place during the Awacs controversy, the desire to make political capital out of Sadat's death overwhelmed sound analysis and led to the rash Reagan pronouncement that the United States would not permit Saudi Arabia to become another Iran. The application of this new "Reagan Doctrine" to Egypt was not clear, since the nature of the threat to the Egyptian regime was still unknown, while the military force that the United States could bring to bear there, if not negligible, was certainly limited.

Nonetheless, it did not appear prudent to wait for additional information about the domestic situation in Egypt before acting to prevent a breakdown in the structure of American influence in the region. The first priorities were to support the successor government of Hosni Mubarak, to prevent the Israelis from withdrawing from the final phase of the Camp David

(Continued on page 40)

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"A 'strategic consensus' in the Middle East, involving Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia, may meet American area interests, but it may cause problems for Mubarak regionally and with the Islamic fundamentalists whose influence, even in the 367,000-strong Egyptian army, may be more pervasive than the new administration would like to admit."

Egypt After Sadat

BY JOHN G. MERRIAM

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THE year 1981 marked the end of the rule of Muhammad Anwar Sadat, born December 25, 1918, in the Nile Delta village of Mit Abul Kom. Assuming the presidency after the death in 1970 of Gamal Abdul Nasser, Sadat fell fatally wounded on October 6, 1981. For some, the highlight of his career was his November, 1977, trip to Jerusalem, capped with an address to the Israeli Knesset. Although it was regarded as his greatest contribution by the West, the memorable Jerusalem visit isolated Sadat from virtually all his Arab neighbors. Yet his opening to Israel led to the Camp David Summit of September, 1978; and from the accords hammered out there between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin came the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed March 26, 1979—some five months after the two leaders were joint recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. For others, an earlier turning point was the 1972 expulsion of the Soviet military presence.

History will have to decide why it was that the Egyptian President who was determined to do so much for his people as he led them down a democratic path felt compelled finally to take an authoritarian turn. His bold moves to reorient his country to the West and to make peace with Israel were initially received with high hopes by the Egyptian people, exhausted by 30 years of war and a stalemate with Israel; but with the passage of time and little result came growing disillusionment. Then, too, economic and social problems arose during this period of rapprochement with Israel and the West, precipitated ironically by Sadat's new economic policy—the 1974-launched Open Door, designed to rehabilitate the Egyptian economy by encouraging private sector and foreign investment. The results so far include insufficient long-term investment from either foreign or domestic sources, inflation, and a surge of materialism among the newly rich, made possible by income from oil exports, migrant worker remittances, Suez Canal tolls and tourist spending. Conspicuous consumption by the few with little benefit for the majority fostered the disruption of social and cultural traditions. Scant prospect of an Israeli grant of Palestinian Arab self-

determination or even meaningful autonomy caused additional Egyptian anxiety.

The interrelationship of these disruptive forces contributed to the frustration suffered by Sadat and the Egyptian public. While professing to adhere to the democratic path, the President resorted to massive arrests of Muslim and Christian extremists and prominent members of the secular opposition in September, 1981. One month later, Muslim fundamentalists avenged their anger by assassination.

Who were the attackers? Defense Minister Lieutenant General Abdul-Halim Abu-Ghazzala, who stood to the left of the President but survived the attack, assured reporters that the assassins numbered only four and were not related to any foreign country. They were led by a Muslim fanatic, army Lieutenant Khaled Shawki al-Istanbuli. The Defense Minister insisted that despite their uniforms the army was not involved and remains loyal. Al-Istanbuli and his brother, who was arrested in a purge of 1,536 Muslim fundamentalists and other opponents the previous month, are members of *Takfir wal Hijra* (Repentance and Holy Flight). How widespread is the organization? According to American University in Cairo sociology professor Saad Ibrahim, *Takfir wal Hijra* is "a sizable movement of between 3,000 and 5,000 active members, highly organized and . . . spread horizontally and vertically throughout Egyptian society."

The members, far from being society's dropouts as some might imagine, possess "high achievement, motivation [and are] upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and are from normally cohesive families." Usually young (the median age of a group previously interviewed was 24) and frustrated members of the middle and lower middle classes, they tend to be newly arrived in the city from rural areas or small towns.

The ultimate goal of the movement, says Ibrahim, is to "topple Egypt's present social order and to establish an Islamic social order." President Sadat's murderers did not carry off a coup, but did achieve their first goal, killing the President himself. For them,

Sadat deserved to be put to death because he made concessions to Islam's three main external enemies: atheistic communism (though he expelled the Russian advisers), the West (i.e., the United States) and, particularly, Zionism.

Intent on establishing a smooth, rapid transition at a critical moment, Egypt's ruling National Democratic party quickly nominated Vice President Hosni Mubarak as Sadat's successor the very night of the assassination, a decision confirmed by Parliament the next day in an emergency session, thus setting the stage for a national referendum.

Even before the election of Hosni Mubarak as President, the major foreign policy question was Egypt's ongoing commitment to the peace process in which Anwar Sadat had deeply believed. Israeli leaders stressed their hope, albeit with a cautious note, that the process would not be deterred by the death of the Egyptian President. In seeking to honor all international commitments, Mubarak specifically pledged pursuit of the peace mission. And Prime Minister Begin reaffirmed Israel's commitment to the peace process. Nonetheless, pressure from the far right may buffet the Israeli Prime Minister and his Cabinet when they attempt the final withdrawal from the Sinai scheduled for April, 1982, and pressure could threaten the governing coalition. Other unresolved issues include autonomy for the 1.2 million Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Approval from the country's 12 million eligible voters was readily won October 13, one week after the assassination, although a shoot-out between five heavily armed Muslim extremists near the Giza pyramids the day of the referendum and other incidents indicated continued unrest. Police linked the group led by Lieutenant Colonel Abu Abdul Latif al-Zamor with the outbreak of violence October 7-8 in Asyut. (Police subsequently identified him as the mastermind behind the plot to kill Sadat and to establish an Islamic republic.)

Early reports on the September, 1981, crackdown described President Sadat as denouncing sectarian factionalism between the Muslim majority and the six million or more Coptic Christian minority. Moves purportedly to reduce this religious strife included the

arrest at the outset of 1,536 whose only common characteristic was their opposition to the regime: university professors, journalists, television and radio producers allegedly engaging in activities "detrimental to public opinion," some of whom were assured of losing their posts. (Few foreign observers paid attention at the time to the thousand arrested Muslim fundamentalists in this group.)

Prominent among those arrested was Muhammad Hassanein Heykal (allegedly because he had "received money" from Pope Shenouda III of the Coptic church to start an anti-Sadat newspaper), a figure well-known in the West as an editor and a confidant of the late President Nasser. Those incarcerated were listed in *Mayo*, the publication of the National Democratic party, the ruling organization, though without identifying titles.¹ Singled out for special presidential criticism was Pope Shenouda III. Towards the end of a three-hour speech to a special joint session of the 532-member People's Assembly and the Consultative Council September 5, Sadat announced cancellation of the 1971 decree installing the Pope as the 117th patriarch of the Coptic church of Egypt (in a line reaching back to St. Mark's founding of the church in 42 A.D.) and stressed the principle of "no religion in politics and no politics in religion."

Antagonism had long existed between President and Pope, despite certain conciliatory gestures to the Coptic community, sometimes estimated at 12 to 20 percent of the predominantly Muslim population, approximately double the official figure. While Sadat complained that the Coptic leader "wanted to become a political leader," the patriarch for his part was opposed to a yet-to-be implemented amendment of an article in the Egyptian constitution making the *Shariah* (Muslim law) the source of legislation, notwithstanding government assurances that personal status and inheritance laws for non-Muslims would remain intact.

Perhaps most significant was Shenouda's stand on the Camp David accords. Originally somewhat receptive to Sadat's call for acceptance of the idea of a peace settlement with Israel, Shenouda reportedly later assumed a more hostile stand. Earlier in 1981, he refused to lead a pilgrimage to Jerusalem despite government pleas because the visit would imply acceptance of a settlement. In July, it was reported that he had attended a meeting of political leaders seeking to unify their stand against the Egyptian President.²

Also a target of presidential criticism was the banned Muslim Brotherhood, whose chief spokesman, 76-year-old Omar Telmessani, was returned to prison in March. (He had spent 17 years in jail during the Nasser era and had been released by Sadat.) A Muslim fundamentalist leader, 25-year-old Helmi al-Gazzar, was another target.³

Sadat tried to legitimize his sweeping measures in a

¹William E. Farrell, "Islamic Brotherhood Denounced by Sadat: Coptic Pope Deposed," *The New York Times*, September 6, 1981, pp. 1-6; "Egypte: L'échec de la libéralisation," *Le Monde* (Paris), September 3-9, 1981, p. 1.

²Olfat M. el-Tohamy, "Why Sadat Cracked Down on Copts," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 22, 1981; and "Shenouda and a Call that Scared Sadat," *8 Days* (London), vol. 3, no. 38 (September 26, 1981), pp. 14-15.

³"Highly Educated Egyptians in Paris Announce the Detention of Five Thousand Egyptians," September 24, 1981, p. 1 and "Imprisonment of Four Persons Accused of Violence in Egypt," September 27, 1981, p. 1, in *Al-Madina* (Jiddah, Saudi Arabia).

referendum where 99.45 percent of those voting approved his crackdown on religious extremists and political opposition. However, the administration campaign against destabilizing religious fundamentalism later shifted in emphasis to a Soviet plot allegedly designed to topple the regime. The Soviet Ambassador, Vladimir Polyakov, six diplomats, two journalists and in excess of 1,000 Soviet technical advisers for Egypt's heavy industry, who were said to be stirring up Muslim-Copt religious fundamentalism, were ordered to leave. The press reported that Egyptian military intelligence had uncovered three plots implicating Soviet and Hungarian diplomats.

Then the focus shifted to reform of the society, which would end religious unrest. In a televised speech September 14 Sadat promised reforms effective October 1 to deal with the "slackness" and "indiscipline" that "the people complain of." The government outlined an ambitious program to overcome virtually overnight the seemingly interminable problems of the poor, in a generally overburdened country, with a frustrating telephone service, traffic jams, street noise, inadequate public cleanliness, and housing shortages. Also cited were inefficiencies in public and private sector companies, the universities and the press.

Many of Egypt's problems seem to defy resolution even in industrialized countries. Yet the government had still further plans. The ministries would attempt to retrain superfluous workers hired in line with a Nasserist policy whereby the government acted for graduates as an employer of last resort. Beyond that, the government set aside \$690,000 for additional security on university campuses, often strongholds of Islamic groups critical of the regime.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

As the Arab country with the largest population (43 million), Egypt must be taken into account in regional affairs. Yet the size of the population, while a source of strength, creates challenges for any administration. Over 98 percent of the people are compressed into the four percent of the total territory that comprises the arable land, mostly along the banks of the Nile River and in the Delta. Few people realize the population density per unit of farmable land is higher in Egypt than in Bangladesh.

To feed the growing population, Sadat (as well as his predecessor, Gamal Abdul Nasser) relied on subsidies for basic foodstuffs and sought to improve agricultural productivity, but with scant success, through higher yields per acre and a vigorous land reclamation policy. Critics nevertheless questioned a land use policy focusing on the development of costly marginal lands while sacrificing prime agricultural land to urban development.

To make the industrial and agricultural sectors

more productive, Sadat encouraged foreign investments under the much heralded *Infitah* or open door policy, which may be seen as a victim of its own success. If the idea was to attract foreign investment and to reenergize the private sector, it succeeded. But is Egypt better off with the 1974 decision to abandon Nasser policies and return to a free market economy? A climate of confidence, it was thought, would encourage local business and foreign investment. Indeed, a year ago the economy looked uncommonly bright, with record earnings in hard currency from oil exports, workers' remittances, Suez Canal dues and tourist spending. Foreign exchange earnings rapidly rose from \$370 million (1970) to \$1.8 billion just two years later, thanks to unflagging demand for oil and major world price increases that year. In 1980, earnings reached \$2.9 billion, with hopes of \$900 million more for 1981, only to run into reduced demand and a softening of world market prices.

Egypt has been producing 675,000 barrels of oil per day (September figures) but the price which reached \$40.50 in early 1981 was down to \$33 for Suez Blend toward the end of 1981. Year-end earnings were expected to be considerably below earlier expectations of \$3.8 billion. The 1,000,000 b/d goal which would increase revenues may be difficult to attain.

Payments sent back to Egypt from two million workers in overseas (mostly Arab) jobs followed a similar pattern, a dramatic rise followed by a slump. Figures for 1978 were \$1 billion, and 1980 figures were a record \$2.8 billion, with the hope of topping \$3 billion in 1981. But remittances are slowing down, notwithstanding the continued presence of Egyptian workers in Libya next door and elsewhere in an Arab world generally hostile to the country that signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Although the Arab boycott in the wake of Camp David had only a temporary effect on tourism from neighboring Arab countries, and although the flow of Western, Japanese, European, and now American Jewish and Israeli tourists continues, revenues are sticking at about the \$700-million level as sophisticated tourists learn to change money on the streets in the so-called "alternative market."

Suez Canal dues, raised in 1980, promised to bring in \$1.2 billion in 1981, but the doubling of the 1979 figure must be weighed against paying off substantial improvement costs.

Egypt's not insignificant foreign exchange earnings coupled with foreign capital inflows and a real growth rate of 8 percent seemed to provide ground for optimism. Yet, genuine growth for which the open door policy must take substantial credit has been accompanied by mounting indebtedness and inflation. Medium- and long-term debt, only \$1.6 billion the year Sadat came to power, soared to \$12.5 billion in a decade.

Western aid, about \$3 billion annually, must be increasingly devoted to the mounting food import bill. Egyptian food production has been marked by what John Waterbury earlier called "a stagnation of yields."⁴ United States agricultural trade with Egypt is expected to run at the \$1-billion level by 1983. Wheat is Egypt's most important agricultural import from the United States and is crucial to supplying Cairo and the other urban centers. In 1980-1981, Egypt ranked as the sixth largest United States wheat customer, with purchases of some 1.5 million tons of wheat and slightly more than 500,000 tons of wheat flour. United States farm exports to Egypt, according to the United States Department of Agriculture, totaled \$770 million.

Hard currency purchases are supplemented by food aid, which also must be paid for by the Egyptian government (and on which Americans also make a profit). The terms are, however, concessional, or below prevailing market rates. Egypt ranked as the largest recipient of United States Public Law 480 food aid program funds in the 1980-1981 marketing year. Again, these were mostly wheat and wheat flour purchases. President Mubarak's confident assumption of leadership will ensure continued food sales and aid. Nevertheless, loans must eventually be repaid. Payments on principal and interest have reached \$1 billion a year; and the projects are slow to pay a return. Problems have been compounded by the 30-35 percent inflation rate.

The 1980 appointment of Planning Minister Abdul-Razzaq Abdul Maguid as economic czar was viewed as an effort to put Egypt's economic house in order—to rationalize trade, supply problems, and the economy itself. While many individuals in the city and the countryside have more material goods than before and although the shops are full, inflation, unemployment and the less detectable underemployment have led to resentment over the materialistic surge and the destruction of the religious-cultural heritage that some critics blame on the Infitah. Egypt's development, like development everywhere, is uneven. Yet Islamic fundamentalists may have a point when they stress that true development in Egypt cannot take place without incorporating traditional Muslim values. The open door policy has in many instances encouraged sheer growth, following the idea that "more must be better," rather than life-enriching development.

Absorbing the bulk of each year's crop of 300,000-400,000 new entrants into the workplace

⁴John Waterbury, *Aish: Egypt's Growing Food Crisis*, Northeast Africa Series 19, no. 3 (Arab Republic of Egypt), American Universities Field Staff, December, 1974, p. 4. See also Ahmed A. Goueli, "Food Security in Egypt," Alberto Valdes, ed., *Food Security for Developing Countries* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1981), p. 156.

⁵"Egypt Lowers Its Pound," *8 Days*, vol. 3, no. 34 (August 29, 1981), p. 19.

would tax any economic system. The government hopes to strengthen the industrial sector in an effort to improve the employment picture. In addition, much of the foreign currency coming into the country flows outside official channels. In an attempt to eradicate the problem, in August, 1981, the government effectively devalued the currency 20 percent in order to bring the country's artificially pegged currency more closely into line with the free market value.⁵

More investment needs to find its way into the countryside; migration to the city and abroad may be partly explained by urban-oriented investment. Disinvestment of the rural areas can only contribute to Egypt's long-term problems of urban congestion and stagnant agricultural production.

EGYPT UNDER MUBARAK

Confirmed by a national referendum in which he won 98.46 percent of the vote, Hosni Mubarak officially took office on October 14, 1981. Depicted as modest, honest, cool-headed, and steady, not a risk taker, with an eye to precision, planning and essential detail, Mubarak is capable of firmness once he has made a decision. What lies ahead? He will ensure that nothing will preclude Israel's fulfillment of its obligation under the Camp David accord to withdraw from the remaining occupied Egyptian territory in the Sinai by April 25, 1982.

Even if American help is forthcoming, it will be more difficult to obtain a more substantial commitment to full autonomy for the Palestinians on the West Bank than Sadat received from Prime Minister Begin. Saudi Arabian leaders and Mubarak may agree that the moment is ripe to end Egypt's isolation from the rest of the Arab world. A "strategic consensus" in the Middle East, involving Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia, may meet American area interests, but it may cause problems for Mubarak regionally and with the Islamic fundamentalists whose influence, even in the 367,000-strong Egyptian army, may be more pervasive than the new administration would like to admit.

At this writing, truckloads of men from Egypt's paramilitary Central Security Forces (CSF) are watching key Cairo locations. Meanwhile, on October 17, 1981, the government banned urban use of fire-arms and conducted a nationwide round-up of some 1,500 more Muslim militants and political opponents.

(Continued on page 38)

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In Iran, "the disappearance of the moderate center, the increasing anarchy and violence, the worsening economic situation, and the inexperience of the latest round of government leaders brought closer the time when a new authoritarianism would appear in order to prevent the disastrous disintegration of a critically important and venerable member of the community of nations."

The Politics of Extremism in Iran

BY JAMES A. BILL

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
AS Iran approaches the third anniversary of the revolutionary overthrow of the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, it is fighting to survive as a coherent nation-state. In 1981, the country had three different Presidents and four different Prime Ministers when the post-revolutionary fissures in the body politic deepened and an undeclared civil war broke out in the form of a contest between regime repression and opposition by terrorism. With the destruction of the government of President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr in June, much of the legitimacy was stripped from the political process in formation. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini began to lose control and indeed contributed to the violence and bloodshed in the wake of Bani Sadr's downfall. The shocking bomb incident of June 28, 1981, represented the end of the first stage of the Iranian revolution and introduced a time of terror. In the bombing, 74 members of the political elite were assassinated, including the founder of the Islamic Republican party (IRP), Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Beheshti, four Cabinet ministers, six deputy ministers, and 27 majlis (parliamentary) deputies.

In retaliation for the massacre, the IRP initiated a campaign of repression that resulted in over 2,000 executions and many thousands of arrests. This, in turn, provoked the opposition groups to a policy of terror that had as its targets the most powerful leaders of the IRP itself. The crippling campaign of violence resulted in the unprecedented assassination of both the Head of Government and the Head of State on August 30, when Prime Minister Muhammad Javad Bahonar and President Muhammad Ali Rajai died together in a bombing of the heavily guarded prime ministry. Many other extremist leaders died violent deaths in 1981, including influential majlis deputy Hassan Ayat (August 5), prosecutor-general Ayatollah Ali Qodusi (September 5), and Khomeini's personal representative in Tabriz, Ayatollah Asadollah Madani (September 11). The IRP, through its coercive arm, the Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran*), reacted by intensifying its own campaign of repression and execution. The last half of 1981 found Iran

trapped in a vicious and spiraling cycle of violence.

The social and political fabric of post-Pahlavi Iran has continued to unravel in the face of government factionalism, personal rivalry, ethnic cleavages, religious fanaticism, ideological confrontation, and economic malaise. Externally, Iran's debilitating war with Iraq moved into its second year, sapping Iran of badly needed human and economic resources. (This war helped deter the Iranian military from intervening directly in the chaotic domestic political situation.) The release of the American diplomatic hostages on January 20 did little to temper internal hostilities as new debates developed about the terms of the agreement. The United States was continually held responsible for failures and upheaval in Iran while the Soviet Union was also deeply distrusted and often condemned. In both its internal and external policies, the Iranian political elite pursued programs that can best be described as incoherent and counterproductive.

To students of the history of revolution and to analysts of social forces and class conflict, the contemporary situation in Iran is not unexpected. The failure of the Pahlavi system to build political institutions and its promotion of social cynicism and factionalism provided a legacy that ensured chaos and violence. The character and ethnicity of the Iranian people, the mind-set of certain leaders of Shi'i Islam, the violence of the revolution itself and the untimely actions of the superpowers contributed their share to today's morass in Iran. The revolution itself was a multiclass movement that has inexorably come under the control of the lower and lower middle classes. In the process, it has devoured many of its own supporters; the upper middle and middle classes have been attacked and peeled away from the post-Pahlavi power structure. While 1979 and 1980 saw the demise of the old aristocracy and the upper middle classes, 1981 was the year in which the professional middle class and liberal intelligentsia became political casualties. At the same time, the merchants and the bourgeois middle class of the bazaar found themselves increasingly under attack and began to organize quietly



against the revolution that they helped to finance.

The competing political forces in Iran can be placed along a continuum from the radical left to the extremist right. It is useful to attempt to freeze the alignments temporarily in order to compare and contrast the forces involved. There are four major groupings of the radical left, two centrist coalitions, and one major extremist force on the far right. (See Figure 1.)

The Fedayan-e Khalq is a nationalist, Marxist group on the far left whose support is drawn from young students and the radical wing of the intelligentsia. Although the theoreticians of the Fedayan differ sharply over tactics, they all condemn what they consider capitalist and imperialist exploitation and seek to build a radical socialist state in Iran. The members of the Fedayan are intensely ideological and have a 15-year history of guerrilla resistance. In 1980, the Fedayan splintered into three main factions including the Fedayan Guerrillas (*Cherikha*), the Minority (*Aqaliyyat*), and the Majority (*Aksariyyat*).¹ While the Guerrilla and Minority splinters have sought to pursue their radical goals independently, the Majority group has revealed a willingness to compromise and to form a front with the powerful extremist right-wing IRP in order to protect their existence and to promote their interests. The Paykar group is a small radical Marxist force with organizational strength among both students and workers. Its position approximates that of the minority wing of the Fedayan.

The Mujahedin-e Khalq is an impressive constella-

¹The dramatic split between the Majority and Minority factions can be traced to June 10 and 11, 1980, when the two groups each published their own version of the party's official newspaper, *Kar*. Both editions were presented as number 62. See *Kar*, 20 and 21 Khordad 1359.

²"The History of the PMOI, 1965-1971," *Mojahed—The Organ of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran*, vol. 1 (May, 1980), p. 20.

³See "The Content of the Islamic Republic," *ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴For an excellent introduction to the various radical political forces in Iran and an informed discussion of their organizational antecedents, see Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977," *MERIP Reports*, no. 86 (March-April, 1980), pp. 3-15.

tion of Islamic radicals who profess many of the same goals as those of the Fedayan and Paykar groupings. The major principle of the Mujahedin is the concept of *towhid* which refers to "a divinely integrated classless society, a society with total equity."² In this ideal society, there will purportedly be an end to the exploitation of man by man. The Mujahedin's campaign against capitalism, imperialism and ethnic exploitation is carefully articulated within an Islamic context and as such represents a major challenge and potential alternative to rule by the extremist right.

Unlike the Fedayan, whose credibility has been severely damaged by its policy of compromise, the Mujahedin forces have refused to waver from their professed goals. Although they initially expressed support for Ayatollah Khomeini, they consistently attacked the rule of the religious leaders on the right, whom they regard as repressive, reactionary and revolutionary dilettantes. In the last months of 1981, the Mujahedin became the major armed force fighting the extremist regime of IRP clerics. Well over 60 percent of those arrested or executed by the government were Mujahedin members or sympathizers.

The other group of the left is the old Tudeh party, which has from the beginning of the revolution sought to protect itself by entering into an accommodation with Khomeini and the IRP. Unlike the Mujahedin who have stood by their ideological commitments, the Tudeh party has pursued a policy of political pragmatism. This has worked as a double-edged sword, protecting the existence of the party in the violent early years of the revolution while damaging its long-term credibility and recruitment potential. The Tudeh party has one further weakness: it has always maintained very close associations with the Soviet Union, an external great power considered a dangerous imperialist threat by the other nationalist groups on the left.⁴

In the center of the political spectrum of Iran today stand two important but amorphous groupings: the secular professional-intelligentsia and the bourgeois middle class. Unlike the more radical and disciplined parties of the left, the moderate groups of the center are large, loose aggregations of individuals who more closely approximate objective social classes than political parties or movements. As such, they have been highly ineffective in the political conflict that has dominated Iran since the overthrow of the Shah. This has been especially true of the professional-intelligentsia, which proclaimed liberal goals and preached progressive reform. Trapped between the ideological radicalism of the left and the religious extremism of the right, the members of the professional middle class have watched their influence destroyed and their revolutionary role disparaged. From Shapur Bakhtiar to Mehdi Bazargan to Bani Sadr, the demise of the center has been complete.

Unlike the secular professionals, the bazaar middle class is somewhat more difficult to write out of the Iranian revolution. It was the merchant class that formed a tight alliance with the Shi'i religious leaders who were central to the success of the victory over the Shah. The bazaaris provide the economic backbone of Iran, and the period of radical-extremist politics has slowly but steadily alienated them. In late 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini himself publicly and frontally attacked the bazaaris, accusing them of preferring profits to the revolution. The forced resignation of President Bani Sadr in June convinced many merchants that the revolution as interpreted by the extremist right had gone astray. Bani Sadr had become popular in merchant circles and his downfall increased their doubts. In mid-July, two prominent bazaar merchants were executed by the regime for allegedly engaging in anti-state activities. Throughout, the bazaaris had become more and more disturbed by the deteriorating economic status of Iran. During 1981, the bazaar began to detach itself from the hardline IRP programs and policies.

The final bloc of players in the contemporary political drama of Iran is the huge and influential religious right, which stresses fundamentalist Islam and which is dominated by the Islamic Republican party. Supported by the masses of Shi'i believers who compose the lower and lower middle class of society, the extremists of the religious right have come to control Iran. This control, won at the expense of both radicals and moderates, is backed by organized Revolutionary Guards and street mobs known as the Partisans of God (*Hezbollahis*). Although many of the most eminent religious leaders of Iran are moderate progressives, not hardline extremists, the role of these clerics has become submerged by the torrential influence of the Hashemi-Rafsanjanis, Mahdavi-Kanis, and Khamene'is. These are individuals who, like their leader Ayatollah Khomeini, were aptly described by Crane Brinton when he wrote that "... only a sincere extremist in a revolution can kill men because he loves man, [can] attain peace through violence, and free men by enslaving them."⁵ History teaches that extremism inevitably comes to prevail as revolutions run their violent courses.

THE DIALECTICS OF DISASTER

By mid-1981, the turbulent revolutionary process in Iran had reached a crossover point. The struggle between the left and right for control of the revolution had been filtered and buffered by the existence of a

moderate center consisting of technocrats, professionals, writers, intellectuals, social scientists, and a wide variety of other liberal thinkers. In the early months of the revolution, these professionals, represented by individuals like Mehdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi, Abbas Amir-Entezam, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Ali Akbar Moinefar, Hassan Nazih, Ali Asghar Haj-Seyyed-Javadi, Ali Reza Nobari, and Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, were a critical and visible force in the revolutionary government. Although radical and immoderate in many of their ideas and actions, these leaders were neither Marxist believers nor religious zealots. One by one, they were defeated and their influence was destroyed by the inexorable attacks of the extremists; they found themselves caught in the withering crossfire between the true believers of left and right.

In 1981, the remnants of the moderate center felt increasing pressure from the religious right in general and the IRP in particular. The moderates' last hope resided in the person of Bani Sadr, the first popularly elected President in the history of Iran. Partly out of desperation and self-defense, Bani Sadr and his group of supporting technocrats began to move leftward on the political continuum and to form an alliance with the Mujahedin-e Khalq. At the same time, Bani Sadr worked hard to establish close relations with the military leaders and was in constant consultation with them at the Iranian-Iraqi war front. This alarmed the religious rulers, who stepped up their campaign against Bani Sadr whom they regarded as part and parcel of the radical Marxist left.

As the IRP accelerated its attacks on moderate and radical groupings, the middle classes were driven further left as they sought refuge from the repression of the right. This convinced the religious extremists that their own predictions concerning the liberals had been correct and that the moderates were little more than Westernized Marxists who sought to turn the revolution away from Shi'ism and toward a form of atheistic imperialism. Thus they intensified their campaign against the moderate intelligentsia in general and against Bani Sadr in particular. Bani Sadr managed to stave off defeat by utilizing his special relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini who at first stood somewhat above the conflicting factions while acting as supreme political arbiter.

In late May, 1981, the leaders of the IRP convinced Khomeini that Bani Sadr was plotting a coup against them and provided the Imam with enough evidence to convince him that Bani Sadr was a threat to the revolution. Khomeini was particularly upset about Bani Sadr's growing relationship with the Mujahedin and asked the President to sever that relationship immediately.⁶ Bani Sadr's refusal to do so convinced Khomeini that the President had become a serious liability to the Islamic revolution. On June 10, Kho-

⁵Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 159-160.

⁶Mansur Farhang in an interview on "The MacNeil-Lehrer Report," September 29, 1981. Farhang was a close adviser to Bani Sadr and was forced into hiding before fleeing from Iran.

meini dismissed Bani Sadr from his important post as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Majlis voted to declare the President politically incompetent on June 21; a few hours later, the prosecutor-general ordered his arrest and on the following day he was dismissed as President. His term of office had lasted less than 17 months.

On July 29, 1981, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, accompanied by Mujahedin leader Massoud Rajavi, fled from Iran and was granted political asylum in Paris. The extremist victory over the moderate center was completed on July 24 when Muhammad Ali Raja'i, with substantial IRP backing, won an overwhelming electoral victory for the presidency.⁷

With the fall and flight of Bani Sadr, Khomeini turned his attention to the organized threat from the radical groups on the left. His scorn for liberal elements in exile was summarized in an address he gave on August 10, 1981.

Hypocrites and infidels can never form a united front. All they do is interview and talk and curse each other, talk and curse us and curse themselves. A group of bankrupt politicians who escaped the country disguised in women's clothes are now claiming that they are going to lead the country! They claim that the whole of Iran supports them. Well, if the whole of Iran supports you, why have you gone? You were in Iran and you had all your supporters with you.⁸

During the vicious struggle for power between the President and the IRP, the other major political groupings were also undergoing significant shifts in policy and popularity. The major loser during this period was the Fedayan-e Khalq, which splintered into three pieces, with the largest section forming an alliance of convenience with the extremist right. In the process, the Fedayan lost much of its appeal, and its supporters became visibly fewer in number. The Mujahedin-e Khalq, on the other hand, increased its strength enormously and found itself drawing large numbers of supporters both from the ranks of the Fedayan to its left and from the moderate intelligentsia to its right. In the first few months after the overthrow of the Shah, the Fedayan's supporters outnumbered those of the Mujahedin by an approximate ratio of five to one. By April, 1981, this ratio remained essentially the same except that the positions of the two parties were reversed: now the Mujahedin clearly outnumbered the Fedayan. With its commitment to Islam, its unwillingness to compromise with the repressive right, its history of opposition to Pahlavi despotism and Western intervention, its appeal to the growing numbers of Iranians disaffected with the state of the revolution, the Mujahedin will undoubtedly be a critical force in the political

future of Iran. It is important to note that as the Mujahedin have increasingly challenged the ruling religious extremists, they have slowly but clearly moderated their own social and political positions.

AFTER BANI SADR

The fall of Bani Sadr had four major consequences. First, the middle classes are without genuine political representation for the first time in revolutionary Iran. This can only result in their continued flight from the country, their cynical withdrawal from serious technical and professional responsibility, and their increased radicalization born of desperation. Second, with the fall of Bani Sadr and his skilled team of administrators, subsequent governments have lacked the professional talents necessary to run a country in today's world. Already, the revolution's cannibalistic tendencies have stripped Iran of its top three or four layers of technocrats. Piety and ideological purity seem poor substitutes for the skills of talented professionals, administrators, technicians, doctors and scientists. Third, Bani Sadr's fall cracked the legitimacy of the post-Pahlavi revolutionary government of Iran. Elected in a popular election in which he received over 70 percent of the vote, the President was a primary creature of the new constitution. His ignominious collapse helped undercut the entire edifice of legitimacy erected so painstakingly after the Pahlavi overthrow. If the Republic's first President is subject to such dismissal, where does political legitimacy reside?

The major consequence of the disappearance of President Bani Sadr was the direct conflict between radical left and extremist right. Positions immediately hardened and confrontation could no longer be filtered through intermediary forces. Khomeini himself lost important leverage. The result was a war for political survival. Very shortly after Bani Sadr's disappearance, an assassination attempt on President-to-be Seyyed Ali Hussein Khamene'i nearly succeeded and seriously injured the powerful mullah. It is especially significant that it was exactly one week after Bani Sadr was impeached that the bombing at IRP headquarters brutally and instantly eliminated much of the leadership of that party. This incident only strengthened the resolve and determination of the extremists in power, who counterattacked the left through a massive wave of arrests, imprisonments and executions. The killing of Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti transformed an increasingly unpopular political figure into an instant martyr. Despite the deaths of Beheshti and six dozen other members of the IRP political elite in June and the subsequent assassinations of leaders like Raja'i and Bahonar, several important extremists have survived. These included mullahs like Seyyed Ali Hussein Khamene'i and his brother Muhammad Hassan Khamene'i, Ali Akbar

⁷Officially, Raja'i received 12,900,619 votes out of a total 14,642,552 votes cast. *Jomhuri-ye Islami*, 6 Mordad 1360/28 July, 1981, p. 1.

⁸*Teheran Times*, August 11, 1980, p. 1.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Muhammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, Hadi Ghaffuri, and Muhammad Yazdi.

The cleavages that divided yet balanced the contending forces in the two years after the fall of the Shah were sharply reduced in the third year. The balanced tension exploited by Ayatollah Khomeini gave way to direct confrontation between two dedicated forces of fanatical commitment. By the latter half of 1981, the clash had become so intense that the hardened but outnumbered groups on the left reverted to their old tactics of urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Both the extremist mullahs of the IRP and the fighting brothers of the Mujahedin have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to die for their beliefs. This mind-set of martyrdom has seasoned the internal conflict in Iran with a flavor of fanaticism, the effects of which will remain in the society for many years.

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE FUTURE OF IRAN

The major hero of the Iranian revolution, 81-year-old Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, found the revolution's third year to be difficult. On several occasions, the wily old leader expressed his exasperation at the continuing conflict and political turmoil that dominated Iranian politics in 1981. His manipulative tactics proved to be increasingly inadequate to the tasks at hand. For example, his policy of playing the two extreme forces off against one another backfired when the Bani Sadr balancing wheel disintegrated and when, by mid-1981, Khomeini threw all his support to the side of the religious extremists. This compromised his leverage and brought him for the first time directly into the political melee.

During 1981, the Shi'i religious leaders played an unprecedented direct role in the day-to-day business of government. The clerics penetrated the Cabinet, where Muhammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani and Muhammad Javad Bahonar held the influential posts of Minister of Interior and Minister of Education respectively. With the bombings of June and August, the places of fallen mullahs like Beheshti and Bahonar were taken by other clerics, and an even higher percentage of extremist religious figures found themselves in government positions. Bahonar had moved from the ministry of education to the prime ministership and head of the Islamic Republican party. In the new government established on September 1, Muhammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani was the provisional Prime Minister and Ali Hussein Khamenei was the new head of the IRP. Another mullah, Abol Majid Mo'adikhah, remained on as Minister of National Guidance. On October 2, the militant cleric, Hojjat ol-Islam Ali Hussein Khamene'i, was elected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

An examination of the mullahs in key political positions indicates that the most extremist among

them were precisely those who wielded the most political influence. Moderates like Ali Golzadeh-Ghaffuri, Muhammad Javad Hojjati-Kermani, and Ayatollah Hassan Lahuti were noticeably and abruptly silenced. The triumph of the extremist clerics was clearly seen in a revealing Majlis incident in June, when the parliamentary body was debating the fate of President Bani Sadr. One of the few individuals who courageously stood to speak in defense of Bani Sadr was a mullah, Muhammad Javad Hojjati-Kermani. Hojjati-Kermani's comments were suddenly smothered when the Majlis Speaker, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, simply cut off the power to Hojjati's microphone. In the heyday of extremism, the moderate mullahs found themselves in a position of suffocating impotence.

Subsequently, Ayatollah Khomeini threw his support to the religious extremists. Early in 1981, he had attempted to curb the expanding and arbitrary power of the religious right. On March 16, for example, he made an effort to contain the influence of the extremists who were already threatening to destroy Bani Sadr. On this occasion, he called a private conference of eight feuding political leaders and told them to terminate their quarrels. Khomeini's grandson also worked to keep the extremist right under control. In an April interview, the grandson, Seyyed Hussein Khomeini, made the following statement:

I think generally it is not necessary to have a religious government. The people should decide and they themselves should run the country. It is not impossible for religious leaders to rule or reign, but it is not necessary. In our country, religious leaders have neither the merit nor the ability to run the country, therefore we need statesmen.⁹

Despite these incidents, by mid-1981 events had begun moving too quickly, and Khomeini abandoned his balancing policy. Doubtless, the Ayatollah's sympathies had rested primarily with the religious extremists all along, but he joined them openly and decisively for two reasons. First, he was worried about Bani Sadr's flirtation with the military and especially with the Mujahedin-e Khalq. Most important, Khomeini maintained a special antipathy against the radical left. He carefully noted the huge demonstration of April 27 in Teheran, where the Mujahedin rallied over 100,000 supporters to protest regime repression. The more the Mujahedin gained in popularity and strength, the more concerned and involved Khomeini became. By June, he decided that it was time to strike a crippling blow against them.

(Continued on page 36)

James A. Bill is the author or co-author of five books including *Politics in the Middle East* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979) and *The Politics of Iran* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).

⁹*Iran Times*, April 24, 1981, pp. 5, 11.

"The central paradox of contemporary Iraqi politics is the fact that a regime so committed in theory to an extreme ideology can pursue in practice such flexible and expedient policies."

Iraq: Pragmatic Radicalism in the Fertile Crescent

BY ARTHUR CAMPBELL TURNER

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SINCE the heavy decline in Iranian oil production, Iraq ranks as the second largest oil producer in the Middle East, outranked only by Saudi Arabia. It may be the Middle East state that has most successfully used abundant oil revenues to bring about industrialization and development and to achieve a workable accommodation with new wealth and Western technology. This process received a rude shock on June 7, 1981, when the centerpiece of the new technology, the nearly completed nuclear reactor in the Baghdad area, was destroyed by Israeli planes. But that raid did not alter the general trend.

In a region of the world not noted for stability, Iraq has been reasonably stable for well over a decade. Its current governing group established itself in 1968, and for 13 years there has been no serious threat to its rule. Only two men have held supreme power in that period, and the transition from one to the other was peaceful. Nor is Iraq's stability accounted for solely by repression. Any expression of discontent, far less rebellion, is severely punished, but it is not at all certain that there is much discontent.¹

Iraqi policies reflect many paradoxes. In one sense a hotbed of nationalism (Iraq has been one of the states most adamantly hostile to any accommodation with Israel and since 1958 has always been vocally anti-Western); in another sense it is questionable whether Iraq is a nation at all. Iraqi nationalism has usually been subsumed in a larger pan-Arab nationalism. Yet this standard bearer of pan-Arab nationalism, this inveterate opponent of Israel, was the only major Arab oil-exporting country that did not participate in the oil boycott of 1973-1974. Pragmatism and profit took precedence.

Nor has its enthusiasm for pan-Arabism led Iraq to work with other Arab states. On the contrary, in the past 20 years, Iraq has disagreed with every one of its neighbors, Arab and non-Arab alike; but disagree-

ments with Arab states have tended to be more serious.

Again, Iraq's theoretical hostility to the West has pulled in double harness with actual cooperation, especially with the United States and France. And although since 1967 Iraq and the United States have not had normal diplomatic relations, American diplomats live and work in Baghdad and Iraqi diplomats live in Washington, D.C., and American economic activity in Iraq is lively.

Geographically as well as culturally, Iraq is the very core of the Middle East—wherever one sets the limits of that hard-to-define entity. Placed at the northwest corner of the Persian (Arabs prefer "Arabian") Gulf, to which it has somewhat limited access, Iraq's neighbors are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. With its area of 168,000 square miles and a population of about 12.5 million, Iraq combines a moderately large size and population with a central location and, for the past several decades, enormous oil revenues—over \$10 billion in 1978.

It has frequently been pointed out that the model of the nation as invented in Europe is singularly ill-adapted to the realities of Africa and Asia. Of this generalization there is no better example than Iraq, a "made" nation, the outcome of British policy. This is precisely the basic difficulty, the exercise in nation-building, with which the present regime in Iraq—like regimes over the past 60 years—has been wrestling in its 13 years of power. In this case, the struggle has met some success.

What are these different groups? Iraq has over millenia suffered waves of conquest and immigration, but a strong tendency towards arabization (voluntary or involuntary) has limited what might otherwise have been indescribable diversity. Three-fourths, or a little less, of the population may be described as Arabs. The well-populated center and south are almost entirely Arab. Arabic, the official language, is the language of the great majority of the population. The most important minority is Kurdish; the two million Kurds who live in the mountainous north constitute the most serious of all Iraq's internal problems. The distinction between Kurd and Arab is the only distinction in Iraq that is perceived in terms of nationality or race.

¹Hanna Batatu has said in a recent interview: "This has something to do with the inflow of oil money. The urban masses in Iraq are now better off. . . . The present regime has obviously alleviated their conditions, though not in any radical manner." *MERIP Reports*, June, 1981, p. 30. Batatu is the author of a recent scholarly work on Iraq, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Although about 93 percent of the Iraqis are Muslim, the fundamental divisive factor in Iraqi society is not race but religion, or more precisely the division between two branches of one religion, the mutually intolerant Shia and Sunni sects of Islam. The Kurds, who are Muslim though not Arab, are Sunni; but even so, the Shias are thought to outnumber the Sunnis nationally in the ratio of seven or eight to five. Within the Arab community, they are almost certainly a clear majority. The Sunni Arabs comprise only about one-fourth of the population. Yet almost continuously since the creation of the Iraqi state political power has largely been in the hands of the Sunni Arabs. This was true under the pre-1958, pre-revolutionary monarchical government. It is true now.

The politically predominant Sunni community is a majority only in the area roughly west of the line Baghdad-Mosul. It is beyond question the most articulate and politically most sophisticated part of the population as well as the most prosperous (Sunni Arabs being on the average more affluent than the Arab Shia population of the south). But it is distinctly a minority, whose political concepts, loyalties and aims have been formulated more in terms of the "Arab nation" as a whole than in terms of an Iraqi nation comprising at least three diverse elements—Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Kurds. It also has to be remembered that Sunni Islam is the mainstream or orthodox version in Islam. Only in Iran are Shiites a ruling majority. Thus the identification of the ruling Sunni Arabs in Iraq with the "Arab nation" necessarily sets them apart from their fellow Iraqi Arabs of the Shia persuasion. Religion is a divisive, not a unifying, force.

In Iraq there are other minorities, among them Turkomans, Persians and Jews, but they are not politically significant. The Jewish population nearly all left after the founding of Israel. A Persian minority of some 200,000 resident near the Iranian border was reduced to half or less by forcible deportations to Iran in the early 1970's. The most diverse areas of Iraq, ethnically, are the northern provinces of Mosul and Erbil.

Modern Iraq was invented by a small band of British colonial administrators, notably Sir Arnold Wilson, and the incredible Gertrude Bell. They proceeded, with the dauntless self-confidence possessed by the British overseas in that era, to create a modern state out of some remnants of the Ottoman Empire, after Turkey had disintegrated. Britain secured the League of Nations Mandate for Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan. It thus controlled almost all the territory between Egypt and India, except for Persia.

Faisal, a member of the noble Hashemite family from the Hejaz, was placed on the Iraqi throne in 1921; a well-managed referendum subsequently confirmed his place on the throne. (Another member of

the Hashemite family was placed on the throne of the adjacent mandated territory of Transjordan, where Hashemites remain.) A treaty between Britain and the new Iraq defined the relationship in 1922: Iraq was to be semi-autonomous, with the British exercising a large measure of control through advisory rights in military and financial matters and foreign relations.

At first not even the boundaries of Iraq were certain. The Arab riverine and delta lands comprising the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad were not in question, but Kemal Ataturk's Turkey claimed the vilayet of Mosul; it was not assigned to Iraq until the Treaty of Ankara in 1926. The name of the new state reflected the dominance of the Arab element—the Arab geographical term *Al Iraq* means the "cliff" or "shore" and refers to the delta lands.

A new treaty in 1930 looked to Iraq's imminent independence but gave Britain *inter alia* the right to maintain air bases. The mandate terminated in 1932 when Iraq became independent and was admitted to the League of Nations under British sponsorship. British and Western influence remained strong during World War II (a British force intervened in 1941 to oust the pro-German Rashid Ali regime in Baghdad) and afterward, until the 1958 revolution. During much of the monarchical period, Iraq was run by the veteran pro-British Premier Nuri es-Said, who embarked on an extensive program of building roads, hospitals and schools, and who encouraged economic development as soon as oil revenues made this possible. Oil began to flow from the Kirkuk field in the late 1920's; additional discoveries were made later at Mosul and at the Rumaila field, near Basra, but the Kirkuk field remains the chief source of Iraqi crude.

THE 1958 REVOLUTION

The domestic policies pursued by Iraqi governments before 1958 were similar to the policies being pursued in neighboring Iran by the Pahlavi dynasty, father and son; there is a strong resemblance between events in Iran in 1978-1979 and events in Iraq 20 years earlier. In each country, a dynasty perished. In each, an openly pro-Western regime and military ally gave way to a revolutionary government hostile to the West and rabidly nationalist.

Iraq seemed solidly ensconced in the Western camp when, in 1955, it became the only Arab state to sign the Baghdad Pact. But nationalist, socialist and Communist forces were growing in strength, especially in the cities; and in the coup of July 14, 1958, Nuri and the royal family were murdered and a republican regime of nationalist officers, led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassim, took over. This inaugurated a period of violent upheaval alternating with praetorian governments that lasted 10 years, until a new stability was achieved.

The government that emerged in July, 1968, led by

President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, was made up of Baath party members. The Baath, or Arab Socialist Renaissance party, had emerged in Syria in the 1940's, but became important only in the 1950's. The party's aims combine pan-Arab nationalism with socialism. In Syria, the Baath has been the ruling party since 1963; in Iraq, it has ruled since 1958. But the two Baath regimes are bitterly hostile toward each other, each claiming to be the sole repository of ideological purity. Within Iraq, the party has borrowed from the Communists the idea of organizing into cells all over the country; and informing on any symptoms of disloyalty is encouraged under the watchful eyes of a vigilant and ruthless security police (whose use of torture has recently been condemned by Amnesty International).

In July, 1979, Saddam Hussein Takriti took over peaceably from the ailing al-Bakr. While he was Vice President, Saddam Hussein's power had long rivaled and may have surpassed that of the President. It is typical of the tightly knit core of power-holders in Iraq that both Hussein and al-Bakr come from the same town, Takrit, as do many other members of the Revolutionary Command Council. It is also symptomatic that the head of the security police is President Hussein's brother.

DOMESTIC POLICIES

The regime faced attempted coups against its authority in 1970 and 1973, but by the mid-1970's stability and general acceptance had been achieved. Today Iraq faces what most observers feel is the most promising economic and social future in the Arab world. For the first time since the fall of the monarchy, elections were held for a national Parliament on July 20, 1980. It was an impressive, albeit well-managed, demonstration. Six million Iraqis voted, women for the first time.

The central paradox of contemporary Iraqi politics is the fact that a regime so committed in theory to an extreme ideology can pursue in practice such flexible and expedient policies. In the domestic sphere, police-state methods consort oddly with social, economic and educational policies that can only be described as enlightened. Iraq has rich resources in minerals, in agriculture, and in its hard-working population. The money, flowing since 1973 in an increasing abundance from an oil industry that was nationalized in 1972, makes good use of the the country's resources. An excellent system of free education has been introduced. Women enjoy full economic rights. Comprehensive social welfare programs and central economic planning are well established. The latifundia of the largest landowners have been broken up, and land

²The best book on the Kurds is Gerard Chaliand, ed., *People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Zed Press, 1980).

has been redistributed to peasants. Unlike the Shah's Iran, Iraq has assigned a high priority to agriculture, although many new industries have also been established. The percentage of success in government ventures has been surprisingly high. No doubt that the ruling Baath party elite and the military profited most from the new wealth, but there was also a general rise in the standard of living.

The greatest domestic problem for many years has been ethnic, not economic. The Kurds, an ancient people who have not achieved their own state, live partly in Iraq and partly in adjacent areas of Iran and Turkey; the areas they live in are collectively known as Kurdistan.² Since 1958, every government in Baghdad has acknowledged that Iraq consists of two people, Arab and Kurd, but the reluctance to grant the Kurds any genuine autonomy has been great. An autonomous Kurdish region was promised in 1970, but the promise was implemented only in 1974, and that in so half-hearted a fashion that a fierce rebellion, the last of many, broke out in Iraqi Kurdistan and raged until 1975. That year the Shah (who had hitherto supported the Kurds) negotiated a treaty (the Algiers pact) with Iraq, in which he withdrew Iran's support from the Kurds in return for Iraqi concessions in the matter of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.

Kurdish resistance inevitably collapsed, and the veteran Kurdish national leader, Mustafa Barzani, died in March, 1979, in Washington, D.C. Many Kurds were forcibly relocated in the south of Iraq, far from their native mountains. At the same time, language and cultural rights were conceded to Kurdistan, and a measure of autonomy was granted. In September, 1980, Hussein's government held the first elections in Kurdistan for the regional legislative assembly. Before the Iranian revolution, the Kurds of Iran were better treated than their national brethren in Iraq or Turkey; but now, realistically speaking, the Iraqi group are the most fortunate, because the Iranian Kurds are in a state of chronic rebellion against the fanatical Shiite government in Teheran.

Contemporary Iraq has in general been a bad neighbor. Its bitter feud with the Syrian Baathists, interrupted only for a moment by military cooperation in the 1973 war against Israel, is the most obvious example of this. In July, 1980, more than 200 people were arrested in Baghdad and, on August 8, 21 former officials and ministers were executed by firing squad. Their supposed offense was plotting against the government with the aid of an unnamed foreign Arab power—obviously Syria. Yet chimerical plans for an Iraqi-Syrian union continue to be bruited from time to time. Iraqi oil is—somewhat intermittently—pumped across Syria to Mediterranean ports, but this route is so vulnerable that a new pipeline that swings north instead, across Turkey, has recently been built.

Iraq regards its small but rich neighbor Kuwait as

properly Iraqi, a sort of *Iraq irredenta*. When the British gave Kuwait independence in 1961, Iraq threatened to take it over. British forces subsequently returned as a safeguard and the Iraqi threat receded in the face of united Arab pressure. There was almost a replay in 1973, when Iraq attacked Kuwaiti border posts and demanded concessions Kuwait found intolerable; again, the joint pressure of Arab states induced Iraq to desist. In the war with Iran, however, Kuwait is cooperating with Iraq to the extent of providing the main supply route by which supplies from the Gulf pass into Iraq, Iraqi Gulf ports being unusable.

On September 22, 1980, Iraq initiated an attack on Iran and occupied a considerable strip of territory along the border, launching a war that continues after more than a year. The scale of fighting has, in fact, been small for many months, and casualties are light. The Iranian city of Abadan was freed in September, 1981, but the war continues.

Iraq's motivation is obscure, but certain lines of speculation suggest themselves. The immediate cause was claimed to be the international boundary on the Shatt al-Arab. There was also the matter of the three small (non-Iraqi) islands in the Gulf that had been annexed by the Shah in 1971, an act protested at that time by Iraq. The Shatt al-Arab boundary question is a complicated legal issue going back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. It is of much more significance to Iraq than to Iran, for the Shatt al-Arab is Iraq's sole access to the Persian Gulf, whereas the Iranian coastline extends along its whole north shore, and Iran has several alternative oil terminals. In 1937, the international boundary was set on the Iranian bank: Iraq controlled the waterway, but there were guarantees for Iranian use of the channel. Iran disputed this settlement several times, notably in 1969. The 1975 Algiers agreement declared that the boundary was on the *talweg*, the center of the deep channel. In 1980, during a moment of Iranian weakness and disunity, Saddam Hussein attempted to reestablish Iraqi sovereignty over the whole waterway.

A quick victory seemed to offer several possibilities: Iraq could become the champion of the Arab world against non-Arab Iran; Iraq might detach oil-rich Khorramshar province, largely Arab in population, from Iran; Iraq might stand for the principle of modernization and development against the reactionary zealots who had taken over Iran. Again, Hussein and his ruling group nurtured a deep (but, as it turned out, exaggerated) fear of Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's appeal to Shiites in Iraq. Iran seemed, in general terms, a threat to the status quo everywhere, and by attacking Iran Hussein certainly earned the silent thanks of every conservative regime in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, the war in all probability reflected a total miscalculation. The opportunity for an easy and

quick victory was illusory; Iraq was soon bogged down in a long war against an enemy with vastly superior manpower resources. Yet all reports indicate that the war has increased President Hussein's popularity. Food and other supplies have remained ample. Casualties have been light; propaganda is incessant; and Hussein has shown himself adept in the arts of courting popularity by appearing unexpectedly in remote villages and towns to charm the inhabitants.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

Since 1968, Iraq has followed a delicate middle path in its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, bending first one way and then the other. In 1972, an alliance was signed with the U.S.S.R., but although the treaty was never abrogated, relations have progressively cooled. In the late 1970's, Communists were ousted unmercifully from the army, the government and all positions of influence in Iraq. While Iraqi communism, once an important force, was being reduced to virtual impotence, Iraq was cooperating more closely with the West, especially with France and the United States.

The atomic reactor destroyed by the Israelis in June, 1981, was French-built. The theoretical breach in Iraqi-American relations that has prevailed since the 1967 war has been circumvented by the ingenious device of "interest sections" in each other's capitals in place of embassies. American economic activity in Iraq is large and growing. American technicians are currently assisting in the hunt for oil in areas west of Baghdad, where prospects look promising. This is only one of the innumerable plans for economic development in Iraq that assume American participation. Iraqi Airways operates with American planes. All this is combined with continuing rhetorical denunciations of Israel and of the United States as Israel's chief supporter.

The historian Michael Hudson sees the basic goal of Arab governments, especially revolutionary governments, as "the quest for legitimacy." In Iraq, thanks to a curious combination of seemingly incompatible policies, the quest seems to be making progress. The keys to legitimacy for a revolutionary government are time and success. Success, in some measure, has already been achieved in Iraq, and the years are passing. But all this could be endangered by a long war with Iran. ■

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"Israel's policy continues to be predicated on the belief that its vital security interests are always at risk and that the basic responsibility for defense against those risks is in Israel's own hands."

Israel's Foreign Policy Challenge

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FOR years, Israel has been a focal point of United States interest in the Middle East, especially during the years since 1967. Although one can argue that the prominence accorded to that small state by the media and the government exaggerates its importance in the regional context, there is little doubt that it will continue to be a vital factor in future political developments. Now that it is possible to place the 1981 election in some perspective, it is appropriate to assess Israel's political condition, and specifically its foreign policy.

There are two key considerations involved in an understanding of the development and evolution of Israel's foreign policy. The first is the ideological factor, which is particularly important because of the intense ideological character of Israeli party politics. A more prosaic but no less important factor is the nature of the political system itself, wherein a Cabinet representing an intricately constructed coalition of often divergent parties assumes collective responsibility for decisions.

The ideological underpinnings of Israeli foreign policy are closely tied to the principles of political Zionism, with its nineteenth century European origins.¹ All the important political parties in Israeli politics accept the notion that the Jewish people have a right to reestablish a polity in the biblical land of Israel, although there are wide variations in details.

The historical experience and Jewish consciousness that helped to influence Israeli foreign policymakers over the years since 1948 include the connection between ancient Israel's land and people and the contemporary Jewish people, the idea that all Jews

¹Samuel J. Roberts, *Survival or Hegemony? The Foundations of Israeli Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 1-20, even tries to draw an analogy with biblical Israel.

²For a more elaborate discussion of these points, see Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), especially pp. 229-433 and 449-550.

³Whether the Jewish people could survive without an independent state is an open question. The Jews survived without a state for nearly 2000 years, but many believe that the conditions of modern life are such that world Jewry could not maintain its vitality without Israel.

⁴Brecher, *op. cit.*, chap. 6.

belong to the Jewish people and are entitled to return to their land, and the centrality of Israel, especially in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Furthermore, skepticism about dependable outside support² and the concern for simple survival have always been paramount in Israeli foreign policy because Israelis are convinced that the loss of a war might well signal the end of statehood and jeopardize the survival of the Jewish people.³

Most of these basic principles have not changed much over the years, with the notable exception of the peace negotiations with Egypt. If anything, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 only reinforced an already existing Israeli insecurity, which was further accentuated by the subsequent diplomatic isolation, the never-ending condemnations from the United Nations and other international forums, and Israeli doubts about great power motivations. Ironically, even when Israel was seen as a very strong power, perhaps the strongest in the region, Israelis saw themselves as being in a far weaker position. The peace treaty with Egypt, however, brought about some major changes, because the possibility of coming to reasonable terms with an Arab enemy became plausible for the first time.

The treaty with Egypt marked a significant departure for Israel in other ways as well. Most of the early political leadership had not thought through the question of relations with the Arabs. They came to assume that they could expect only hostility from that quarter, and preferred to concentrate on strengthening the Jewish presence. Although there were various attempts to find a *modus vivendi*, developments under the British Mandate precluded amicable relations. By the time the Arabs invaded Israel in 1948, the assumption of Arab hostility had become a dominant strain in Israeli perceptions of the outside world. Even now that the peace treaty with Egypt is a reality, Israel's assumption of continued hostility in other Arab countries influences its foreign policy stance.

The second key consideration for an understanding of Israeli foreign policy is the way in which the political system operates.⁴ Because the members of the Knesset are elected in a pure proportional representation system with national lists, the parties and their announced principles become very important in

determining policy outcomes. An individual voter cannot call an individual member of the Knesset to account, but as a voter he can take the party to task for not holding true to its promised intentions. The ideological nature of most parties may act as a constraint, because fundamental party positions often deal with matters central to foreign policy decisions. Such positions can easily become hardened over the years because they acquire a status similar to an article of faith.

Another relevant feature of the Israeli political system is its reliance on coalition governments, because no party has ever achieved an absolute majority in the Knesset.⁵ Coalition partners are represented in the Cabinet, which has the major responsibility for foreign policy and security decisions. The existence of a coalition that accepts the idea of collective responsibility implies voting in the Cabinet. Depending on the political and personal strength of the Prime Minister, unexpected outcomes may follow. Usually there is genuine debate and finally a vote in the Cabinet. But the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister (and perhaps the Defense Minister) do not have a free hand on important issues and, in fact, are often bound by explicit Cabinet guidelines.⁶ When the governing coalition is formed, usually after protracted and complex bargaining and negotiation, a formal agreement spells out in some detail what policies the government will follow, including foreign policy.

In general, then, the structure and practices of the government tend to limit the flexibility of those formally charged with responsibility for foreign affairs. Insofar as they are strong leaders within their own parties they can usually obtain approval, but the diverse nature of the coalitions requires considerable deference to various partners; witness the designation of Interior Minister Yosef Burg, head of the National Religious party (NRP), as the chief negotiator for the autonomy talks.

At present, Begin has considerable latitude in foreign affairs, although he does not operate without restraints. Since his Likud is the major rightist party, he does not have to worry very much about attacks from further right, even though the small Tehiya

party criticizes him from that perspective. From the left, the Labor Alignment has been sharply critical of several aspects of his policies toward the territories, most notably the relinquishing of the Sinai settlements near the international border and the basic concept of the autonomy plan. Presumably, Labor would prefer a new partition of western Palestine between Israel and Jordan to an autonomy plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But these criticisms are not enough to prevent Begin from proceeding with any chosen course of action. Labor also challenged aspects of two controversial actions in the summer of 1981, the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the bombing of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) installations in Beirut, but with only marginal effect.

The Liberals within the Likud, which is itself an alignment of Begin's own Herut party and the Liberals, also constitute a potential check on Begin's flexibility, although their power is limited by the widely held perception that they could not succeed electorally without Begin. Hence, if they create too much difficulty in the Likud caucus they might face oblivion, forced to run under their own banner in the next election. On balance then, Begin has considerable flexibility with regard to foreign policy options. Were he to embark on a risky adventure or initiative, however, that situation would probably change.

In assessing Israel's current foreign relations, one must first turn to the domestic scene.⁷ Domestically, the salient event of 1981 was the surprising victory of the Likud in the June 30 parliamentary election. Actually Likud and Labor finished in a deadlock with 48 seats each in the 120-member Knesset, but Begin was the preferred choice for Prime Minister of the main smaller parties, so that a Labor-led coalition was simply not feasible.

Because of overconfidence and internal bickering, Labor failed to capitalize on an opportunity for a smashing victory, a prospect that seemed most likely through the winter and into the spring. Begin ran a clever campaign, utilized the powers of the government to great advantage in terms of both economics and foreign policy, and established a surprising rapport with the majority of Sephardic voters, particularly those of North African origin. Begin, who is certainly no less Polish in origin than Labor party leader Shimon Peres, was immensely popular among North African Jews, perhaps because of his deference to Jewish tradition, which contrasted sharply with the usual Labor insensitivity.⁸ As a result, Likud had a clear majority among Jewish voters, while the Labor totals were augmented by the votes of many Israeli Arabs. Thus the apparent closeness of the election is probably misleading. Most analysts believe that Labor is in a fundamentally weaker position politically than Likud, and events tend to bear this out.

⁵Polls showed that Labor would get one in January, 1981; by the fall of 1981 they showed Likud with a majority. In the June, 1981, election neither party was able to exceed about 40 percent of the votes and seats.

⁶At a crucial Cabinet meeting during the crisis leading up to the Six Day War in late May, 1967, the Cabinet split 9-9 on the question of whether to go to war immediately. See Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 396.

⁷Some examples of this connection are cited by Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-21.

⁸N.B. Argaman, "Why Begin Appeals to Oriental Voters," *The Jerusalem Post International Edition*, no. 1085 (August 16-22, 1981), p. 14, describes how the Oriental Jews have come to regard Begin as "one of us."

Among the smaller parties, the National Religious party (NRP) lost half its seats, causing a great deal of soul-searching among the party faithful, who perceive that their constituency may be drifting toward the Likud. The NRP also lost votes to an ethnic splinter group (Tami) led by Aharon Abuhatzera but retained an influential role in government nonetheless because of the arithmetic of a coalition. The ultra-Orthodox Agudat Yisrael held its ground electorally and was rewarded handsomely when it joined the coalition under very favorable terms.

The most important observation about the election was the unusually high portion of the total vote garnered by the two leading parties (about 80 percent), which led some observers to believe that the country is moving toward a two-party system despite the limitation of proportional representation. If so, this is probably a healthy development, though the voters still seem reluctant to contemplate majority government.

After the election, Israel continued to be beset by internal conflict. Most of the issues are not new, including economic strategy and disparities between European and Oriental Jews. What the election did produce was a heightened concern over religious questions. Secular interests have accused Begin of making concessions to the religious elements in order to put his coalition together at the expense of the traditional status quo. The intense feelings on both sides, combined with the political reality of a government that can command only 61 seats out of 120, make it likely that religious differences will continue to plague the government. The specific issues are not terribly important (greater public Sabbath observance, more financial support for the religious sector), but the implications are taken very seriously.⁹ In essence, the religious groups want the state to be Jewish in a religious as well as in a national sense. Even though they recognize that the majority of Israelis will never practice Judaism as they do, they wish to maximize public observance. Secular Jews, in contrast, wish to maximize their individual liberty, which is often reduced by religious strictures.

Begin, who is beholden to the religious parties for political support, made a number of commitments to them in order to induce them to join the coalition, but does not seem disposed to accede fully to their demands. The threat of new elections has been most helpful to him. On the crucial question of determining the national and religious identification of Jewish

converts from outside Israel who apply to immigrate, Begin has expressed support for the religious parties' legislative objectives but refuses to impose party discipline when the matter comes up for a vote. On a free vote, the measure is unlikely to pass.

Economically, Israel is still beset by the massive problems that emerged in the wake of the 1973 war. The country has so far managed to cope with the world's highest inflation rate, primarily by indexing all sorts of financial values. To North Americans who cringe as inflation rates climb into the low teens, it is impossible to understand how Israel can cope with rates 10 or 12 times higher. Yet until now the system has managed to function, and the economy seems reasonably prosperous, despite a continuing serious imbalance between exports and imports.

Although no Israeli can be untouched by economic problems, the great issues of war and peace and, more particularly, the ultimate disposition of the various territories now held by Israel continue to animate public and private discussions. The peace treaty with Egypt has enjoyed wide support, despite some misgivings regarding the complete return of Sinai. There is some organized opposition to the final pullback in April, 1982, including people who are not personally involved in the Sinai settlements but are concerned about security questions. This movement has had relatively little impact. Whether the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat will affect the Sinai is one of the key questions confronting the Israeli government between now and April. Unless the Egyptian government changes course dramatically, it is unlikely that support for a reconsideration of the treaty obligations will become very strong. Nonetheless, Israelis will be giving careful thought to the implications of the treaty and the risks that are being undertaken for the sake of peace.

The West Bank presents an even more complex problem, because of the intensity and commitment of the settlers there and their supporters throughout Israel. They remain a small minority, but they cannot be overlooked or ignored politically. And they are often joined by a broader group of citizens who worry about a West Bank under hostile control. This broader group is a powerful check on policy.¹⁰ In fact, Begin or his successor could be faced with extremist opposition to his West Bank policies, operating outside the parliamentary framework. At present, the prospects for an agreement that would activate the extremist opposition appear slim, but as long as negotiations are in progress the situation is fluid.

Turning to foreign policy, Israel was badly shaken by Sadat's death, despite reassurances from the new leadership. The question, usually unposed, of what would happen to the peace with Egypt should Sadat die, had been in everyone's mind since Camp David. The question had to be answered sooner than had

⁹Several articles on this question are found in *The Jerusalem Post International Edition*, no. 1085 (August 16-22, 1981), pp. 8-9.

¹⁰For a discussion of the militant nationalist groups, see Rael Jean Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), chapters 3 and 5.

been anticipated. Sadat's blunt pronouncements, which were probably idiosyncratic, had reassured Israelis and contributed to a sense of well-being. The differences between Israel and Egypt over the autonomy plan were always substantial, but Sadat's attitudes and behavior encouraged optimism. Furthermore, Sadat's isolation from the rest of the Arab world, coupled with his American support, made the notion of an alliance, with Israel and Egypt as the cornerstones, a logical objective of United States policy. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's efforts to repair his country's severely diminished standing in the Arab world may invalidate much of this optimism. The changed situation is likely to make Israeli policymakers wary and less likely to take risks. That would mean a tough Israeli line at the autonomy talks and a reluctance to consider any initiatives.

It is obvious that one of Israel's major foreign policy objectives in the post-Sadat period is to keep relations with Egypt on an even keel, to make sure that normalization proceeds apace, and to convince the Egyptians that, whatever their relationship with the rest of the Arab world, it is in their own interest to maintain peaceful relations with Israel. The months after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai is completed will be particularly dangerous because of possible pressure on Egypt to nullify the effect of the treaty. If the autonomy negotiations have not been completed successfully by then, the continuing failure to agree could serve as a pretext for Egypt to retreat from its obligations. Thus both Begin and Mubarak have a great incentive to conclude the talks successfully before April, 1982, and thereby to eliminate the major points of disagreement between them. Unfortunately, each has a different interpretation of the critical points, which were deliberately left ambiguous in the Camp David accords. The difficulties in overcoming these differences cannot be minimized.

The pressure on both sides for accommodation on the autonomy plan is offset by the mutual desire not to offer new concessions during a time of great uncertainty. This places Begin in an extremely difficult situation: if he makes further concessions on the autonomy issue, even reciprocated concessions, he may have to accept defense and security risks that exceed the level he considers prudent. But if he holds firm and no autonomy agreement is concluded, he runs the risk that the peace with Egypt, at least in the sense of normalization, will be jeopardized. And the April 25, 1982, deadline poses a significant additional constraint on an already difficult situation.

Even while Sadat was alive, the normalization

process had not been moving smoothly. Many Begin-Sadat meetings dealt with Israeli grievances on this question, like the slow pace of tourism (which has primarily meant Israelis visiting Egypt), the negligible academic exchanges, and the disappointingly few intellectual and cultural interactions. Israel sees progress toward the normalization of relations as one test of Egyptian goodwill, the significance of which is all the greater now that a new government must be evaluated.

"JORDAN IS PALESTINE"

On a matter that has bearing on the autonomy plan, Israel's government seems to be pursuing a new policy that is intended to complement it. The essence of the policy is the emphasis on the fact that "Jordan is Palestine." Of course, that country now known as Jordan was part of the original Palestine Mandate assumed by the British after World War I, although what was then called Trans-Jordan was severed from the rest of the Mandate in 1922 in order to establish a throne for the Hashemites. Moreover, most of Jordan's population is Palestinian. The Israeli objective is to identify Jordan with Palestine in order to reduce the pressure for a three-state solution. If it is agreed that a two-state solution (i.e., Israel and Jordan-Palestine, dividing the territory of the original Mandate and perhaps operating a joint condominium over some of that territory) is acceptable, negotiations become considerably easier, because both the Jewish and the Palestinian Arab peoples would have homelands. Demands for a third state sandwiched between Israel and Jordan have always been met with fierce opposition from Israel on the grounds of security and the threat to Israel's existence. Current speculation about the "Jordan is Palestine" gambit focuses on Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who reportedly views the plan as a way to defuse PLO demands, with or without King Hussein.¹¹

Progress in gaining recognition that Jordan is Palestine would also take pressure off Begin with regard to the autonomy plan. There are indications that Begin had not thought through all the implications of the plan when he agreed to it at Camp David. Even if he were able to proceed with autonomy based on his own interpretation of what it would mean, the prospects of preventing the emergence of a new state in the autonomous area after the five-year transi-

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¹¹Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister, argued that "Jordan is a Palestinian Arab state in everything but name" and used the phrase "Jordan is Palestine" in a New York speech reported in *The New York Times*, October 6, 1981, p. A10.

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"The American 'strategic relationship' with Israel runs directly counter to Jordan's hopes for its relationship with the United States. . . . Jordanians hope that Washington will acknowledge the logic of the moderate Arab argument and recognize that United States interests in the region cannot survive everlasting support for Israeli occupation of the West Bank."

Jordan and Arab Polarization

BY ADAM M. GARFINKLE

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A GAINST all odds, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is still a going concern, some 60 years after Britain's Winston Churchill and his associates carved the Transjordan from the Palestine Mandate and set the Emir Abdallah, the homeless son of Sherif Hussein, to reign over it with British protection and subsidy.¹ By any measure, Jordan has not enjoyed a smooth or painless journey these past six decades. Jordan has no oil and little water. Although its population today, even counting the West Bank, is only around three million, it still exceeds the natural carrying capacity of the land. Jordan has never been able to support itself without substantial foreign aid and still cannot do so despite a vibrant economy.

Nevertheless, the kingdom has survived the turbulence of the interwar period, the continuous struggle with radical Palestinian nationalism and the Zionist movement, and the fact that it is "stuck on the wrong side" of the postwar polarization of the Arab world, a circumstance that undid the other family domain, in Iraq, in 1958. Jordan has experienced the trauma of two wars with two waves of refugees (1948 and 1967) and has nervously witnessed two others (1956 and 1973). Finally, the civil war of 1970 and the accompanying invasion by Syrian forces nearly put an end to the kingdom.

Against this history, the country today, particularly in its regional context, is surprising. Iran and Iraq are at war. Syria occupies Lebanon and is ruled by terror; Beirut is in ruins, yet the fighting there goes on. Israel suffers from unprecedented political division and economic distress. Saudi Arabia faces domestic instability, uneven economic development, and more foreign workers than it knows how to control. Egypt, despite great efforts, is desperately poor and politically isolated. Jordan, by contrast, is at peace (by Middle

Eastern standards, at least). The country is experiencing an economic boom, indirectly benefiting from both the new power of oil and the devastation of Beirut, as well as from its own efforts. Its leader, King Hussein, is the longest genuinely reigning head of state in the world. Jordan maintains close, if periodically strained, relations with the United States and good relations with West European states, and the King is also welcome in Moscow. Domestic political violence has all but vanished.² And, finally, Jordan is the subject of extraordinary diplomatic interest: by virtue of its pivotal geography, Palestinian demography and recent history, the country may hold the key to a settlement of the core issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The improvement of Jordan's economic and regional political position over the past half dozen years or so has been the consequence of shifting cleavages within the Arab world and a patient and agile diplomacy designed to make the best of them. But Jordan has not always been so fortunate. Between King Hussein's accession to the throne in 1953 and the June, 1967, war, Jordan was plagued constantly by unstable or aggressive neighbors and the problem of controlling vast numbers of Palestinians—refugees and others—whose sympathies toward the Hashemite dynasty were either weak or absent altogether. These troubles proved especially volatile when mixed; Hussein's rule was frequently threatened by violent expressions of Palestinian nationalism precipitated by the emergence of Arab radicalism in Egypt and, later, in neighboring Iraq and Syria. But by judiciously combining physical repression and skillful co-option, Hussein survived his internal difficulties while managing, simultaneously, a stable but tense *modus vivendi* with Israel.

These fragile balances were disrupted by the 1967 war. After the loss of Jordan's West Bank and East Jerusalem and the humiliation of military defeat, the Palestinian nationalist antagonism toward the Hashemites reached new levels. The Palestinian fedayeen, the only Arab force not besmirched by ignominy, soon won the admiration of most Palesti-

¹There are many accounts of this colorful and complex period. For one, see Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill*, vol. 4: 1916-1922 (London: Heineman, 1975), pp. 558-72.

²For much of Jordan's history, this has been a severe problem. One King (Abdallah), two Prime Ministers (Hazza al-Majali and Wasfri Tell), and numerous others have fallen before assassins' bullets.

nians, who still comprise more than half of the Jordanian population on the East Bank. By mid-1970, Palestinian guerrilla organizations had established a loose state-within-a-state in Jordan, forcing Hashemite authority into retreat. The struggle exploded into civil war when Hussein scored his first significant diplomatic triumph after the 1967 war: Jordan's inclusion in the United States diplomatic initiative terminating the war of attrition, the ceasefire of August, 1970. Splinter factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conspired to plunge the country into civil war. But despite some assistance from allies in Syria, the fedayeen were defeated by the Jordanian army and, one year later, were finally expelled from the country.³

Damaged by defeat in 1967 and the expulsion of the fedayeen, Jordan's standing in the Arab world was reduced still further by its very marginal participation in the October war of 1973. Between 1967 and 1973, Jordan's domestic cohesion and international position had reached a nadir. The country was economically bereft, diplomatically isolated, and vulnerable to political intrigue from any number of directions. This left the King in a weak position to fend off the PLO's political assault on Jordan's trusteeship for Palestinian interests—a claim that had carried weight not because of Arab enthusiasm for it but only because of the reality established by a quarter century of physical control.⁴ Especially after the October war, King Hussein had struggled against the deepening recognition of the PLO's claim to speak for the Palestinians. Recognizing that the status quo ante was out of the question but still seeking to maximize Jordanian influence over the West Bank, in March, 1972,

³This episode, which took place near the forest of Ajlun, is the more probable origin of "Black September," not the civil war of the previous year.

⁴No Arab regime ever recognized King Abdallah's annexation of Arab Palestine. On the other hand, the Jericho Conference of 1948 provided a certain legal justification for the annexation and the granting of Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians eventually gathered a logic of its own.

⁵See Uriel Dann, "The Jordanian Entity in Changing Circumstances, 1967-1973," in Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, eds., *From June to October: The Middle East Between 1967 and 1973* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977) and Norman F. Howard, "The Uncertain Kingdom of Jordan," *Current History*, February, 1974. For the plan itself, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), *Daily Report* (Middle East and North Africa), March 17, 1972.

⁶For a brief account, see Mohammed Watad, "Reflections on West Bank Elections," *New Outlook*, April-May, 1976, pp. 12-31.

⁷See Abdallah's own views in Philip Graves, ed., *Abdallah Ibn Hussein: Memoirs* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), and Israel Gershuni, "King Abdallah's Concept of a 'Greater Syria,'" in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank: A Handbook* (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, April, 1973), pp. 139-46.

Hussein proposed a federation plan that suggested two regions, two capitals, two Arab national cultures, but one army, one foreign policy and, most important, one King.⁵ The federation plan would not be forced upon the Palestinians, but the King expressed confidence that they would choose it if given the opportunity after liberation. Instead, at the Rabat summit meeting of 1974, the Arab countries gave the PLO the exclusive right to represent the Palestinian cause.

Under the circumstances, Jordan publicly accepted the verdict of the Rabat summit meeting, but the King strove to minimize its impact, particularly in the West Bank, where he deployed Jordan's remaining influence through the manipulation of money, legal favors, and family connections. Although Jordan's position suffered, as evidenced by the anti-Hashemite results of the West Bank's 1976 municipal elections,⁶ Rabat alone could not overturn the overall relationship between Palestinian nationalists and the Hashemite dynasty.

THE PALESTINIAN ARAB MOVEMENT

The Palestinian Arab national movement arose during the 1920's and the 1930's in response to the British occupation of Palestine and the growing strength of the Jewish community motivated by Zionist ideology. The movement was unified by the simple and straightforward proposition that Palestine was Arab and should be ruled by Arabs, but it was divided over personalities and strategies. During the late 1930's and early 1940's, the Palestinians, led by Haj Amin al-Hussaini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, courted Nazi patronage. This enraged the Emir Abdallah, who remained faithful to Britain; his abiding contempt for Palestinian politicians grew stronger. He opposed a Zionist state, but he also opposed a sovereign Arab entity in Palestine that blocked his aspirations for a "greater Syria."⁷ For their part, the Palestinian nationalists resented Abdallah for his connivance with the British and his tacit acceptance of the Balfour Declaration that provided for the establishment of Israel. The Palestinian movement failed to prevent the birth of the state of Israel in 1948. Even worse, those parts of Palestine not occupied by the new Jewish state fell into the hands of Abdallah, whose ambitions were forwarded by local Palestinian notables, who resented the al-Hussaini clan.

It is remarkable how little basic patterns have changed. The Palestinians are still engaged in a prolonged blood feud, some allied with the Hashemites and some standing against them. PLO leader Yasir Arafat has inherited the position of the Mufti and, in fact, descends from that very clan. But, as was the case 30 years ago, many Palestinian families have allied themselves with the Hashemites, a connection whose closeness has grown throughout the years as Jordanian society has developed. Today,

Palestinians in Jordan are the loyal backbone of the state and are indispensable to the functioning of the monarchy.

King Hussein has inherited both the problems and the advantages of his grandfather, Abdallah. One of the problems is that the PLO is the incarnation of the old Palestinian nationalist axiom that Palestine is all Arab and that there is no room for a Jewish state there. Like his grandfather before him, Hussein rejects this absolutism and is willing to live in peace with the Jewish state in part of post-1922 mandatory Palestine. Thus, the PLO political program is only marginally less hostile to Hashemite Jordan than it is to Israel.

Also, Hussein is no fonder of the PLO's close relations with the Soviet Union than his grandfather was pleased by the alliance between Palestinian nationalists and Nazi Germany. One of Jordan's advantages is that, despite Rabat, Hussein knows that Arafat's PLO is no more the sole representative of the Palestinians than the Mufti was 40 years ago. The PLO has never ruled any Palestinians; Hussein has and still does.

Between the Rabat summit meeting and the spring of 1976, Jordan hoped to break out of its isolation through a cautious alliance with Syria, by means of which Hussein sought to engage Egyptian interests in keeping Jordan from aligning itself too closely with Egypt's archrival in Syria. In doing so, he did not wish to encourage the American "step-by-step" approach supported by Israel and Egypt, nor to sever Jordan completely from useful future developments in which Egypt might play an important role. Inter-Arab quarrels rendered this a relatively ineffective stratagem, however, until Syria and the PLO came to blows over their respective conflicting interests in Lebanon. Since Jordan's own civil war had isolated Hussein, the Lebanese civil war offered him a way out.

Jordan was the only Arab state to support Syria's actions against the PLO in Lebanon in the late summer and early fall of 1976. At first, this support threatened to lead Jordan further away from Egypt. But, with its military in control of most of Lebanon, Syria soon found a shared interest with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in settling the Lebanese crisis: Syria wanting Arab support for the new *Pax Syrianica* and Egypt and Saudi Arabia hoping to extinguish the crisis in anticipation of new American peace initiatives. A spate of Arab summitry toward the end of

1976 resulted in (limited) collusion between Jordan, Syria and Egypt that exploited the PLO's weakness and that, in effect, undermined the Rabat resolutions.

By the time Jimmy Carter assumed the American presidency, Jordan had staged an impressive diplomatic comeback. Its economy, too, had revived with the increased flow of Arab financial subsidies (made possible by the oil price hikes of the previous few years) and the transfer of Western business from the rubble of Beirut to the new boom-town of Amman. Jordan's flexibility abroad and prosperity at home put the country in a receptive mood for the new United States administration's expected initiatives.

But as these initiatives developed, Jordan was displeased. The Carter administration seemed more eager to achieve a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute than its predecessor. And since it refused to support either an independent Palestinian state or the indefinite Israeli occupation of the West Bank, this pointed logically to United States support for an enhanced Jordanian role. Instead, through 1977, the Carter administration seemed more intent on encouraging the moderation of the PLO, enhancing its stature despite its adventure in Lebanon.

Moreover, as Soviet influence in the region reached a low ebb, Washington sought to reintroduce Soviet participation in regional diplomacy in pursuit of a comprehensive settlement via the Soviet-American communiqué of October, 1977.⁸ The decision to turn first to the most recalcitrant parties and the most intractable issues placed the entire effort at the mercy of those whose interest in peace was least pressing. Unwilling to tolerate stalemate, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat recast the hardening diplomatic mold by traveling to Jerusalem in November, 1977.

Jordan's initial reaction to Sadat's bold ploy was more cautious and less condemnatory than that of the rest of the Arab world. This demonstrated both the limits of Jordan's recent political emergence and its basic moderation. Although Egypt was the party most likely to advance a Jordanian role in the West Bank in the context of peace, the opposition of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and other Arabs made a Jordanian alignment with Egypt far too risky. This was particularly true because, in May, 1977, the Israeli elections had brought to power a political coalition, the Likud, whose attitude toward Jordan was vastly different from that of its Labor party predecessor. Instead of stressing Jordan's role as a potential negotiating partner, the Likud claimed Jewish rights in the West Bank based on religious and ideological rather than security grounds. The new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, had never recognized the 1947 United Nations partition; some members of his Cabinet suggested that there already was a Palestinian state—Jordan—only its ruler was not a Palestinian.⁹

⁸The communiqué was issued on October 1, and undone by October 4. See Harvey Sicherman, *Broker or Advocate? The U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-1978* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1978), pp. 57-60 and Raymond Cohen, "Israel and the Soviet-American Statement of October 1, 1977," *Orbis*, fall, 1978.

⁹This is, for example, the attitude of Ariel Sharon, currently Israel's Minister of Defense.

Given the unlikelihood that negotiation with Israel could satisfy even minimum Jordanian interests and the dangers of antagonizing stronger and wealthier neighbors, Hussein resisted the persistent attempts of the Carter administration to draw him into the peace process as it strove to magnify the multilateral implications of Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.¹⁰ At the same time, Hussein never closed the door on joining the talks and, when the opportunity presented itself, negotiated by proxy to maximize United States pressure on Israel in a way that might serve Jordanian interests. This tactic worked to a limited degree, but in the aftermath of Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, the balance of risks and benefits involved in joining the United States-brokered negotiations apparently precluded Hussein's participation.

ARAB POLARIZATION

Within months of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Arab world exhibited signs of further division and polarization. For Jordan, a united Arab world is a convenient Arab world, where choices that will invariably antagonize a stronger country are not forced on it: As the Arab world fractured between the "Rejectionist" front led by Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms and the "Steadfastness" front led by Libya, Syria and South Yemen, Jordan was forced to choose. Given Jordan's political affinities with the more anti-Soviet, conservative regimes in the area, Hussein sought protective refuge from the Rejectionists, whose association was solidified at the Baghdad summit meeting of November, 1978. In order to assure Jordan's separation from Egyptian policy, the Baghdad Summit offered Jordan \$1.25 billion per year, with most of the funds coming from Iraq. But Jordan was not only a compliant recipient. Fearing a retrogressive spasm of radicalism as a response to Egyptian policy, Jordan worked hard to moderate the resolutions of the Baghdad Summit. Although they established very demanding conditions for peace, the Baghdad resolutions did commit Iraq, for the first time, to the principle of a negotiated peace with Israel, implying tacit recognition of Israel's existence.

The fracturing of the Arab world after the Sadat initiative was also uncomfortable for the PLO, which, like Jordan, is not well served by choices that cannot fail to make enemies. In the case of the PLO, whose various groups are beholden in differing degrees to

many sources of funding and support, cleavages in the Arab world are especially aggravating. While it behooves Jordan to minimize divisions among the Arab countries and to blunt extremism on the central issues where possible, it suits Jordan to maximize divisions within the PLO and to exploit those divisions wherever possible. To this end, since mid-1979, Jordan has managed to erect a new détente with parts of the PLO based on grudgingly shared interests.¹¹ The rapprochement allows prominent Palestinians simultaneously to associate with the PLO, to defend cooperation with Jordan, to talk with Israelis, and even to call publicly for moderating changes in the PLO's political platform.¹² That such a combination is even possible explains why the smaller, more radical PLO groups vehemently oppose any cooperation with Jordan, fearing Hussein's attempt to eviscerate the PLO politically and to co-opt it into submission.

Indeed, it appears to be Hashemite policy to seek out and ally with those Palestinians willing to cooperate with the monarchy and to weaken and isolate those who are not. Today, this struggle not only pits PLO Palestinians against non-PLO Palestinians but also parts of the PLO against other parts. Hussein's intent is to join those elements willing to accept a more moderate approach to peace with Israel with like-minded Palestinians on the West and East Banks who are already at peace with Jordan, either out of economic interests accumulated over some 35 years or out of the realization that a Jordanian solution represents the best Arab hope of recovering the occupied territories. This Palestinian coalition, cooperating with Jordan, will call itself the PLO, only if the King and his allies seize the label for the sake of legitimacy.

While Jordan's policy of co-optive moderation may seem narrowly cynical, it is not so simple as that. By all accounts, King Hussein is a sincere Pan-Arabist and a devout Muslim whose concern for the plight of the Palestinians is genuine and deep. But Hussein, like his grandfather before him, has never been convinced that Palestinian interests are well served by hostility to the Hashemite family or by an absolutist rejection of Israel. In Hussein's view, it is the extremists among the Palestinians who bring ruin and suffering on their people.

Jordan's public avowal of support for an independent Palestinian state and for the PLO seems a part of Hussein's plan. Such a declaratory posture helps Palestinian moderates inside and outside the PLO to defend cooperation with Jordan and helps Jordan to

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¹⁰The Saunders Mission was most illustrative. See my "Negotiating by Proxy: Jordanian Foreign Policy and U.S. Options in the Middle East," *Orbis* (winter, 1981), pp. 854-57.

¹¹See Asher Susser, "Jordan," in Colin Legum, ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 3, 1978-1979 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980), especially pp. 634-41.

¹²See, for example, Anwar Nusseiba's remarks in *New Outlook*, May, 1981, pp. 6-11.

"There is . . . no doubt that Turkey's affinities and aspirations still rest with Europe and the United States. . . ." Nonetheless, "discord between Turkey and the United States may persist and become more acute. . . ."

Turkey's Policy in Flux

BY JAMES BROWN

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HISTORICALLY, Turkey's geographic location astride the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus projected it into the arena of power politics. In addition, its close proximity to the Soviet Union has given it a unique importance, most especially since World War II. As a result, Turkish foreign policy and security needs cannot be examined apart from superpower rivalries.*

Since 1945, Turkey has based its foreign policy and security ties on the United States and West Europe. It welcomed its membership into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact threats from the north. Its links to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe, and its associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) evidenced strong commitments to the West, politically and economically. This is a logical extension of Kemal Ataturk's westernization philosophy.

Recently, however, Turkey has sought a more independent stance in foreign affairs by reorienting its policy in several areas: improving relations with the Soviet Union; seeking closer ties to the Arab world; and attempting to develop a new defense posture while continuing its association with the West and NATO.

Concurrent with shifts in foreign policy, Turkey's domestic politics began to unravel by mid-1970. The global recession, the energy crisis and the increase in

Turkey's defense spending (aggravated by Cyprus) affected its economy negatively, resulting in a 25 percent unemployment rate, an inflation rate in excess of 100 percent, a trade deficit in excess of \$3 billion, and an acute shortage of foreign currency reserves. All this further resulted in shortages of imported raw materials, thus cutting industrial production to only 50 percent of capacity.

Against a background of two decades of ineffective governments (1961-1980), polarization, terrorism and economic dislocation, 1979 witnessed the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the downfall of Muhammad Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran. The combination of domestic social tensions and uncertainty on Turkey's borders was apparently too much for the Turkish armed forces to bear; for a third time they intervened. This coup d'état was not unexpected.¹ The reluctance of the military to undertake this coup rose from the knowledge that in their two previous attempts they were not completely successful, although constitutional government was quickly restored. Furthermore, if General Kenan Evren and the National Security Council failed in this attempt to restore viable institutions, they feared that the last institution of legitimacy would disintegrate.

The immediate tasks of Evren's government were threefold. First, a new political system was needed. Second, the draconian economic reforms that Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel put in place in 1980 had to be continued. Last, and perhaps most important, the complex problem of the *gecekondus* (the shantytowns or slum areas where unskilled and unemployable rural Turks reside—the spawning ground of terrorist groups) required immediate and sustained attention.

The first step toward a return to constitutional government was taken by the National Security Council in July, 1981, when it promulgated the law establishing a constituent assembly. Former politicians and individuals who were members of a political party on September 11, 1980, were forbidden to participate. It is the aim of the National Security Council to assemble a group of individuals untainted by association with the murky politics of the past.² The danger is, however, that the consultative assembly will consist of retired officers and retired civil servants. At the

*The author gratefully acknowledges the Ora N. Arnold Foundation, Dedman College, the Provost's office and the Office of Research Administration of Southern Methodist University for their financial assistance to this project.

¹Throughout the latter part of the 1970's the National Security Council, the Turkish Armed Forces supreme military authority, warned the civilian governments and urged "all constitutional bodies to unite, show solidarity, and support one another to save the country from the dangers facing it and from the impasse where it now finds itself." These cautions were repeated on several occasions (both privately and publicly). See *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, vol. 7, no. 11 (January 2, 1980).

²The Constituent Assembly will consist of 160 members; comprised of 120 provincial representatives selected by the National Security Council from among candidates suggested by the governors of the provinces. Another 40 will be directly appointed by the National Security Council.

earliest, national parliamentary elections under the new constitution will most likely be postponed until 1983.

On the economic front, the National Security Council has continued the economic policies introduced by the Demirel government in January, 1980. In addition, other steps have been taken (e.g., reform of the tax system, freeing of interest rates, banning of strikes) to ease Turkey's economic plight, and these economic stabilization measures are apparently taking hold. The inflation rate has receded from a high of over 100 percent in 1980 to about 35-40 percent today.

Industrial exports and workers' remittances are rising under the stimulus of the repeated devaluation of the Turkish lira, and capacity utilization and industrial output are improving as the inflow of foreign credits allows imports of essential supplies to rise. So there is a glint of sunrise on the economic horizon. This improvement was not accomplished without massive economic aid from the West. In June, 1980, Turkey signed its third stand-by loan agreement of \$1.25 billion with the International Monetary Fund. In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany, announced a major aid package of \$460 million in September, 1981. Naturally, in its extremity Turkey welcomed help from any quarter, including a \$250-million loan from Libya and trade agreements with the Soviet Union.

In fact, the geographical direction of Turkish exports has greatly shifted. In 1979, 49 percent of Turkey's exports went to European Economic Community countries and only 13 percent to the Middle East. These figures shifted in the first quarter of 1981 to 30 percent to the EEC and 33 percent to the Middle East. Although Turkey's most important trade partners are still the EEC countries, this shift in exports is reflective of a general change in Turkish foreign policy.

In addition to the deterioration of the economy, domestic tensions were of major concern to General Evren's government. Before the September 12 coup, political life was polarized. The alarming rise in domestic violence, precipitated in part by clashes between right-wing and left-wing students, broadened and became an urban phenomenon, as villagers with strong provincial ties drifted into the major cities. Regional rivalries and conflicts festered among the jobless in the *geçekondus*; an endless cycle of retribu-

tional violence followed. This violence also had religious and ethnic dimensions: Sunni Muslims locked into feuds with the Alawi (Shiite) Muslim minority³ and the Kurdish minority (numbering about 5.6 million), which crossed sectarian lines.

In November, 1980, approximately 200 people a month were being murdered in the ferocious warfare between extremists. A year later, the death toll has been almost eliminated. The National Security Council was particularly eager to be impartial in tackling the problem of terrorism, whereas evenhandedness was a commodity that the previous civilian governments never achieved.

The most immediate accomplishments of the Evren government have been in the foreign policy area. First, General Bernard W. Rogers, NATO commander, reached an agreement with Turkey on Greece's return to the military wing of NATO. And in July, 1981, the Turkish Cypriot government, for the first time and with the backing of Ankara, offered the Greek Cypriots territorial concessions on Cyprus. These offers were not overly generous, but as modest as they are, they have been hailed as a breakthrough. On the surface, NATO's southern flank is now apparently cohesive and stable. But an impartial analysis of the available facts indicates that both Greece and Turkey made "goodwill gestures" without abandoning their basic principles. This lack of substantive resolution not only affects the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey but also collides directly with Turkey's relations with the West, more specifically its relations with the United States and NATO. Conversely, any fissures that result push Turkey to seek associations that may be inimical to the West.

FOREIGN POLICY

Turkey's post-World War II foreign policy inescapably links Turkey with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Historically, relations with the Soviet Union were a cornerstone of Kemal Ataturk's foreign policy, and Moscow constantly reminds Turkey of that fact. However, Turkey remains wary in the light of centuries of hostility, 13 wars, a common frontier, and Moscow's undiminished ambition to control the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. In the post-war period it was the Soviet Union's reassertion of its historic expansionist aims against Turkey, coupled with British retreat from the eastern Mediterranean region, that gave birth to the alliance between Ankara and Washington. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 forged this alliance.

Turkish-American ties were further strengthened when Turkey sent troops to fight in the Korean conflict in 1950 and joined NATO in 1952. In 1954, Turkey permitted the establishment of military installations on its soil; these ranged from intelligence gathering posts to airfield and supply depots.⁴ The

³The worst confrontation between the two groups took place in the southeastern town of Kahramannaras in December, 1978, lasting three days and resulting in 100 deaths and over 1,000 injuries.

⁴There are 26 U.S. defense installations in Turkey today. Of these, four are major intelligence bases: Belbosi, Diyarbakir, Karamürsel and Sinop.

possible use of these bases by United States forces is the subject of controversy today. Turkey also joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Central Treaty Organization in 1959; although these organizations did not involve Washington directly as a member, they were offshoots of the United States security strategy in the Middle East.

During the 1960's, this close alliance began to show signs of strain, and in the 1970's these tensions were exacerbated.⁵ It remained for the 1974 Cyprus crisis to precipitate the most serious damage to the relations among Turkey, the United States and NATO, to the benefit of the Soviet Union.

In July, 1974, acting on orders from Athens, Greek military forces on Cyprus⁶ backed a right-wing extremist coup d'état to overthrow the legitimate Cyprus government of Archbishop Makarios. This time Ankara invoked its right of intervention without waiting for reaction from Washington.

As on previous occasions when the Cyprus issue flared, the overriding United States concern was not the rights or wrongs on either side or the fate of the two communities on the island, but rather the way to limit the potential damage to NATO and to the American strategic position in the Mediterranean. Thus the United States sought to defuse the situation and, above all, to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece that would be disastrous for all concerned. While the American intervention in 1963-1964 had succeeded in averting a confrontation between these two NATO allies, it did nothing to further a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. Most important, it aroused the resentment of both allies, each of which felt that the United States had betrayed it in supporting the other. The immediate impact of the

1974 Cyprus issue was felt by NATO, with Greece's withdrawal from its military wing.

Turkey's response was less immediate, but in the long run may prove more serious. The most serious cause of friction between Ankara and Washington was the arms embargo imposed by the United States Congress in 1975, which was ultimately rescinded in 1978. This action, regarded by most Turks as an insult to a loyal ally, aroused widespread Turkish indignation. At the same time, the Soviet Union was quick to rush to Turkey's aid by selling it 60 military helicopters, thereby reaching a new plateau in security sales with a NATO country. Predictably, Turkey responded by closing temporarily the 26 United States-Turkish bases in July, 1975. In 1981, all facilities utilized by the United States are regarded as Turkish facilities and have Turkish base commanders.

Exactly seven years after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots offered the Greek Cypriots specific territorial concessions.⁷ The Turkish proposal would relinquish control of about three percent of the territory Turkish forces occupy, including the once-fashionable hotel district of the coastal city of Varosha. In exchange for territory, the Turkish Cypriots want constitutional guarantees to protect them from Greek domination in a future two-state federation. Both the Greek Cypriot and the Athens governments, although displeased with the proposals, are interested in continuing the discussions; and Ankara is most interested in resolving the imbroglio.

The lifting of the embargo and the 1980 United States-Turkish Defense Agreement for defense cooperation improved relations, but Turkish pride and national sensibilities have been offended, and these have traditionally been potent political forces in Turkey. In particular, faith in the United States as a dependable ally has been burdened with an extra psychological dimension. This cannot be discerned easily, but it is bound to make itself felt in Turkish perceptions of future security needs.

It is not an unrelated coincidence that since the mid-1960's the Soviet Union has been benign in its relations with Turkey. In fact, immediately after the "Johnson letter,"⁸ Moscow shifted its position on the Cyprus issue from siding with Greece to neutrality, and by early 1965 it had suspended the shipment of arms to the Greek Cypriots. In addition, the Soviet Union voiced opposition to the concept of *Enosis*⁹ and promised to assist the Turkish Cypriots economically. Symbolic of the new era was the visit of Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in late 1966, which culminated three months later in Soviet economic assistance for large-scale Turkish industrial projects. The economic gain resulting from improved Turkish-Soviet relations was one of the outstanding successes of Ankara's politics. Turkey currently receives more aid than most third world nations,⁹ and Soviet aid

**In the mid-1960's, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonou suggesting that the United States might not come to Turkey's aid in the event of a Soviet attack. Consequently, Turkey decided against intervening in Cyprus despite what it perceived as a legitimate pretext under the Zurich-London accords of 1960 to intervene on behalf of the island's 18 percent Turkish minority. Johnson's letter humiliated Turkey and made the Turkish armed forces appear to have been manipulated by the self-interest of the U.S. For details of President Johnson's letter and President Inonou's reply, see *Middle East Journal*, summer, 1966, pp. 386-93.

⁵Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., "Turkey and U.S. Security: Between NATO and the Islamic World," paper presented at the American Political Science Association, September, 1981, p. 16.

⁶It is estimated that over 10,000 Greek officers and NCO's had come to Cyprus secretly.

⁷With 20 percent of the population the Turks control 38 percent of the island. Some 20,000 Greek Cypriots have been displaced.

⁸A Greek term meaning union with Greece.

⁹See *Turkey 1981 Almanac* (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1981), pp. 185, 230-31.

compares favorably with the aid given to Turkey by any Western nation.

Thus far, Moscow has avoided linking economic aid to specific political demands. However, the 1978 Turkish-Soviet agreement entitled "The Principles of Good-Neighborly and Friendly Relations" stated that neither nation would allow the use of its territory "... for the commission of aggression or subversive actions against the other state." A literal interpretation of this clause would prevent the operation of United States and NATO surveillance flights and the monitoring of Soviet missile testing in compliance with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Salt II). Soviet diplomacy, coupled with détente, is apparently succeeding in neutralizing the Soviet Union's southern neighbor by capitalizing on Washington's diplomatic failures.

The Soviet Union is also reaping salutary rewards. This became evident in 1976 when the aircraft carrier *Kiev*, which is forbidden transit under the Montreux Convention of 1936, was permitted transit through the Straits because the Soviet Union classified it as an antisubmarine cruiser, a misrepresentation which Turkey was willing to accept. And although the *Kiev* incident provoked outcries from Western circles, in the end NATO officials declined to take any action. In 1978, also, United States had to abandon a plan for a special declaration by NATO members reaffirming their faith in the alliance when Turkey refused to comply. It was in this light that Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit declared in May, 1978, that the Soviet Union was not a threat to Turkey.

However, by 1980 clouds had appeared on the horizon; the Soviet Union was once again being viewed as expansionist, in light of the moral and economic support (weapons, supplies) that the Kurds and other militant groups were receiving from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries. During this period, Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union, and Iran began to disintegrate.

All these events proved unsettling for Turkey. This resurrected specter of Moscow's deceptiveness will in no way erase the bitterness and mistrust that Turkey feels toward the United States, particularly since 1975. This resentment runs very deep and wide throughout Turkey, and will in the future manifest itself in "unanticipated ways in how Ankara proceeds in its relations with the United States and NATO."¹⁰ The threat to United States and alliance interests in Turkey is a loss of influence rather than an ideological split.

Although the Cyprus issue may be the most salient national security problem that Turkey has faced since

1963, two additional factors further complicate Turkey's relations with Greece and indirectly affect her relations with the United States and NATO. The first issue concerns the right to explore for minerals, primarily oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. Under international law, a nation has the right to explore for mineral wealth on its own continental shelf, but the Turkish mainland and the Greek islands share the same shelf (e.g., Chios, Kos, Lesbos, Samos). Based on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Greece maintains that these and other islands have their own continental shelves, while Turkey's position is that the Aegean islands have special characteristics that require a special solution. Further clouding this issue are the limit of the territorial waters of these islands and the militarization and fortification of these islands by Greece, which would appear to be in violation of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.¹¹ This latter problem led Turkey to create the Army of the Aegean headquartered in Izmir, in 1975. This is the only Turkish military unit outside of NATO.

The second issue concerns the right to control the airspace over the Aegean. This concern was partially resolved when both Turkey and Greece, in February, 1980, lifted restrictions on civil aviation flights over this area. The question of the two countries' military flights into the area still remains deadlocked, awaiting settlement within the framework of NATO.

As a gesture of goodwill, in October, 1980, Turkey dropped its objections to Greece's reentry into the integrated military structure of NATO. Although the exact command and control arrangements in the disputed Aegean area are still to be worked out, this conciliatory gesture toward Athens seemed to shore up the southern flank of NATO, at least temporarily. Andreas Papandreou's victory in the recent Greek elections directly affects the outstanding issues that plague Turkish-Greek relations. If Papandreou lives up to his campaign promises, Turkey will be faced with a more nationalistic Greece, a Greece that might altogether end her participation in NATO and in the EEC. On the other hand, Papandreou may be one of the very few Greek politicians who can negotiate with Ankara and perhaps arrive at some resolution of these outstanding problems.

About seven years ago, Turkey undertook a concerted effort to expand its ties into the Middle East.

(Continued on page 37)

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¹⁰Interviews conducted in Ankara at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 28, 1981.

¹¹Both Turkey and Greece observe the six-mile limit in territorial waters. If Greece extends this limit to twelve miles, Turkey has given notice that it would be a *casus belli*.

"The international community fears that the fighting in Lebanon will get out of hand, escalate to involve Syria and Israel, cause the failure of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and lead ultimately to a confrontation between the superpowers."

Divided Lebanon

BY WILLIAM W. HADDAD

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THE past 18 months have been difficult for Lebanon; in many ways the present situation is worse than the 1975-1976 civil war. At that time, there were fronts that one could avoid, but today sniping and car bombs bring death with no defense. The number of killings is averaging 100 per month, even in the period since July, 1981, when the latest cease-fire took effect.

Until August, 1980, Lebanon enjoyed a two-year respite from fighting. That period of relative calm fell between the March, 1978, Israeli invasion of the south and the Israeli strike in August, 1980, against Beaufort castle, a Palestinian stronghold near the Litani River. The Israeli attack signaled an increase in military activity and Lebanon was again the victim.

What is particularly depressing for the Lebanese is that there seems to be no way out of the fighting. The number of groups struggling in Lebanon is over 100. This number increased arithmetically in the 1970's and in a perverse Malthusian manner increased Lebanon's problems geometrically. The internationalization of the fighting means that the very real domestic causes for the civil war seven years ago have been subordinated to outside interests.¹ The President does not control his palace; the government does not even control its offices. In what other country could thugs stop a Prime Minister's car and confiscate the weapons of his bodyguards with impunity? Because of this anarchic condition, one begins to feel that Lebanon, the nation, no longer exists.

If one looks at a map of Lebanon, one can see how the country has been divided during the last five years. In the south is "Free Lebanon," ruled by a renegade Lebanese army officer, Sa'd Haddad, who acts as Israel's surrogate. North of Free Lebanon is territory under the nominal control of the 6,000-man United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Along the coast, Palestinians have control from the UNIFIL area north, plus the cities of Tyre and Sidon. The eastern half of Lebanon is controlled by the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), which at this time contains only Syrian soldiers.

The Lebanese Right controls the territory to the west of the ADF area and north of Beirut. Around Tripoli, former Maronite President Suleiman Frangieh has carved out a small section. He broke with the largely Maronite Right in 1978 and continues to be a Syrian ally.

Beirut, the capital, is chopped into many fiefdoms. One usually speaks of Beirut as being divided into east and west but this only tells part of the story. The Leftist alliance, for example, which controls West Beirut is itself divided into innumerable factions.

Lebanon's social structure is a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Then called the millet system, the organization of the population according to religious groups was institutionalized in the Lebanese National Pact of 1943, which allocated power and responsibilities to different sects. Under this "confessional" system, based on a census taken in 1932, there are 15 recognized sects in Lebanon, and they regulate most aspects of a citizen's life. Although originally it was liberal in intent, because it allowed religious and social freedom for all, the confessional system hindered the development of a sense of Lebanese nationalism, froze in place each group's political power and kept alive Lebanese clannishness.

Furthermore, because Lebanon was divided into religious groupings, leading families from Lebanon's feudal era were able to maintain themselves in power. For example, the Karami in Tripoli and Usayran in the south were old feudal houses that emerged as powerful political forces in the new republic. The Maronites, who held a plurality in the 1932 census, were given the most powerful positions, including that of the presidency, and were able to use their power to enrich themselves. However, over the course of 30 years the demographic situation changed dramatically. The Shiites, the third largest sect in 1932, had grown to be the largest by the mid-1970's. When they (and others) called for a change in the National Pact to reflect population shifts, those groups which had benefited most from the confessional system's rigidity refused.

A Lebanese wrote in 1970 that Lebanon was a country composed of people divided against each other.² This created social and economic problems, and the very rigidity of the system mitigated against

¹See for example the article on Lebanon in *The New York Times*, May 26, 1981, p. A3.

²Nasif Nassar, *Nahwa Mujtama' Jadid* [Toward a New Order] (Beirut, 1970).

their solution. Economic planners called for an equitable distribution of wealth but never said how that should be achieved. Lebanon's laissez-faire economics brought in a great deal of capital that never reached the poorest elements of society. Slowly, the country became an economic pyramid, with large gaps separating the few wealthy at the top from the many poor at the bottom. That the system lacked compassion is illustrated by the fact that throughout the 1970's no single major public works program was designed to help the southern third of Lebanon, where most of the poor lived. They felt abandoned by the government in Beirut and the opulence they saw in that city made them angry. Whenever the disadvantaged demanded a greater share of the nation's wealth, the wealthy resorted to violence. When the civil war began in 1975, a good deal of the early fighting centered around looting, gunrunning and smuggling.

Added to this dismal picture were high inflation in the early 1970's and wages that did not keep pace. After 1973, when oil prices climbed, petrodollars came pouring into Beirut, adding to the upward pressure on prices. The change between 1970 and 1974 was dramatic. For a poor Lebanese, or one on a fixed salary, it became virtually impossible to live in one's own country. On the other hand, many in power benefited from the lively business atmosphere. In 1974, the disenchantment of the poor materialized in labor disputes—50 strikes in one 30-day period. The resulting war was largely economic in origin, although some poor fought with the Right and some rich fought with the Left.³

Westerners, and some Lebanese, preferred to interpret the war in a religious context, but this did not stand under close scrutiny. The Lebanese Right, champions of the status quo and dominated by Christians, received support from Muslim Arab countries and from Sunni Lebanese. On the Left, many Christians fought with the Muslim majority. Today, 40 percent of Lebanon's Christians live in areas controlled by the Left.

Even if the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976 was largely economic in origin and would have occurred no matter what the circumstances, the presence of the Palestinians on Lebanese soil acted as a catalyst. The Palestinians went to Lebanon in 1947 as refugees. Numbering over 100,000, they were placed in refugee camps that were often located near factories where they provided cheap labor. When they organized, realizing that if they were to return to their homeland they had to struggle, they came into conflict with the Lebanese authorities. With the formation of the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, the stage was set for tension.

As part of its sovereignty, a government wants to assert authority over all its territory. On the other hand, a revolutionary movement operates outside the law; it must be able to work clandestinely and to move covertly across national borders. Perhaps Lebanon could have accepted this if the Israelis had not held Beirut responsible for controlling Palestinian guerrilla activity. This was explicitly demonstrated when an Israeli raid destroyed Lebanon's commercial air fleet in 1968. In effect, Israel was asking the Lebanese to choose whether to fight Israel or control the PLO. The Lebanese Right decided on the latter course, while the Left defended the Palestinians. The Israeli attack made greater the already existing differences amongst the Lebanese people. An attempt to work out a *modus vivendi* resulted in the Cairo Agreement of 1969 whereby the Palestinians gained control of their camps and, in return, agreed to limit their activities against Israel to certain kinds and from certain areas in Lebanon.

The civil war in Jordan in 1970-1971 doomed the fragile Cairo Agreement. Many Palestinians were forced out of Jordan into Lebanon, which they viewed as their final refuge. Today, there are perhaps 400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and it is the only territory from which they launch guerrilla operations. As they see it, the Cairo Agreement limits their ability to act in the only territory where they have some freedom. Palestinian frustration increased in 1974 and 1975 with the signing of Sinai I and II between Egypt and Israel. Because Sinai II renounced the use of force, thus effectively neutralizing Egypt in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinians felt abandoned by Egypt and realized that their national interests were to be subordinated to Egypt's desire to regain the Sinai peninsula, which it had lost in 1967. Feeling deserted by Egypt and bombarded by Israel, the Palestinians found a natural ally in the poor Lebanese of the south, themselves forgotten by Beirut. Thus was born an alliance of the "have-nots" of the Middle East.

In January, 1975, Israel was attacking almost daily into Lebanon. As a result, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Right and head of the Phalangist party, called for a popular referendum on the PLO's prerogative to operate out of Lebanon, arguing that a majority of Lebanese would vote no. In February, the government announced that it would give a license to a fishing company to be headed by former President Camille Chamoun, a leader in the Rightist alliance. The issuance of this license gave rise to Leftist demonstrations in the city of Sidon, because fishermen there feared that the building of a modern fish processing facility would mean the end of their livelihoods. The demonstrations ended in violence, with the death of the parliamentary member representing the town.

³For a more detailed exposition of this, see Halim Barakat's chapter, "The Social Context," in P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider, eds., *Lebanon in Crisis* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979).

As the alliance of the poor and the Palestinians, the Left saw Gemayel's demand for a referendum and the violence in Sidon as Rightist attempts at suppression. The Left responded by calling for increased participation of the have-nots in the Lebanese political and economic arena, focusing attention on increasing Leftists in Parliament and calling for a new census. The Right responded that the National Pact of 1943 was inviolable, that there were no problems the Lebanese could not solve if left alone, and that Lebanon's problems were brought about by the unwanted presence of Palestinian foreigners.

In April, 1975, the Phalangists attacked a bus, killing all the Palestinian riders. This signaled the beginning of the civil war, which did not end until October, 1976. Though the fighting began for economic reasons, ultimately economics became unimportant. The Right consistently argued that the only problem was the presence of the Palestinians. Though it tried to stay out of the early fighting, the PLO later entered on the side of the Left.

The Arab states played a destructive or neutral role. Some Arab governments, regarding the PLO as a hindrance to a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, supported the Right. Other Arab governments wanted the Left to win because they supported revolution or thought that a Leftist victory would be an Islamic victory. Still others favored any movement that would end Western influence in Lebanon.

The United States played no visible role during the conflict. Its position was difficult; its refusal to recognize the PLO meant it had little influence with the Left. One might argue that West European nations could have taken a stronger stand, but their good relations with Arab governments, which themselves were divided, mitigated against any decisive role.

When the Lebanese army, reflecting its society, disintegrated into factions and sects, the fighting became horrendous. Since the beginning of the fighting, 80,000 people have been killed in a country of 3 million.

One might ask, who was paying for the war? The answer is largely foreign nations. And once the war was funded by outside interests, they demanded loyalty to their respective causes. Lost were the original reasons for the war. The existing militias, or newly created militias, were being used as proxies to contest all the ideologies, national antagonisms and personal animosities that permeate the region.

In order to stop the carnage, the United States supported an agreement between Syria and Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Yigael Allon sent a letter to the United States in March, 1976, outlining the conditions under which Israel would accept Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The letter was passed to Syria. One may speculate with some certainty that Syria was to have free reign in the northern two-thirds

of the country while Israel was to have control of the skies and a sphere of influence in the southern third, below an imaginary "Red Line" where its enemy, the PLO, was concentrated.

In line with the agreement, the Syrian army marched into Lebanon. On one level, there was considerable satisfaction that the Syrians had arrived to end the bloodshed. But to end the war, they had to stop the Left (which by the summer of 1976 was winning the war) because one Syrian aim was to restore a balance between the two sides. The Arab League legitimized the Syrian army's presence by calling it the Arab Deterrent Force, which numbers 22,000 men.

The end of the fighting in October, 1976, saw Beirut divided between Left and Right, with the Left and its Palestinian allies holding West Beirut. Most of the PLO forces, however, returned to the south to face their traditional enemies, the Israelis.

Renewed PLO and Israeli hostility reached a peak in March, 1978, when Israel attacked the Palestinians by invading south Lebanon. The United Nations condemned the invasion and created UNIFIL to supervise the Israeli withdrawal and return south Lebanon to the Lebanese government. UNIFIL has been unable to fulfill its mission, because Israel turned over a seven-mile-deep enclave to the Rightist, Sa'd Haddad. Israel and Haddad argued that giving their buffer zone to UNIFIL would mean the return of the PLO and its attacks into Israel. The creation of "Free Lebanon" in 1978 was an embarrassment to the Lebanese government. Its official position is that Haddad (who was officially dismissed from the army in April, 1979) and his Israeli allies are resisting the reassertion of government control over all Lebanese territory.

Haddad receives training, arms and other supplies for his 2,000-man force from the Israelis. In order to enter Haddad-land one goes through Israel. To publicize his view that Lebanon is occupied by foreigners, largely Palestinians and Syrians, Haddad has established two radio stations, which play American country and western music when they are not broadcasting Rightist propaganda. In February, 1981, "Free Lebanon" acquired a television station. The money for this \$1-million enterprise came from High Adventure, a Christian fundamentalist organization in California associated with George Otis.

Whatever Haddad's protestations, it is clear that he serves Israel by keeping Palestinians from the Israeli border. That this policy has won over some Lebanese cannot be denied. Only 40 percent of the 100,000 people under Haddad's control are Christian. Many Muslims have come to believe that the PLO brings nothing but problems for them in the form of Israeli attacks, and they have shown a willingness to join Haddad's forces. There is also some fear that the

Palestinians may ultimately be settled in the south and the Lebanese may therefore lose their land.

UNIFIL is caught between the PLO and Haddad. More than 60 soldiers of the United Nations force have been killed since 1978. Whenever UNIFIL attempts to increase its control in the south and to turn territory over to the Lebanese government, Israel and Haddad open fire.


The tacit agreement reached in 1976 between Syria and Israel yielded benefits for both countries. The Israelis gained influence in the southern third of Lebanon, and the Syrians were able to prevent the Left from gaining a victory which would have led to a pro-Palestinian government in Beirut. The Syrian government would like to see a negotiated settlement and does not want to become embroiled in another conflict with Israel, which a Leftist government in Beirut might have precipitated. Furthermore, by controlling two-thirds of Lebanon, Syria gained control of an area that might be traded later for the Golan Heights.

However, the congruence of interests that linked Israel and Syria in 1976 ended with the Israeli invasion of 1978 and Israel's subsequent alliance with Haddad and the Lebanese Right. Horrified by the possibility of a Rightist victory in a renewal of the war, Syria switched its support to the Left and the PLO.

The Leftist alliance is bound together by its commitment to an economically and politically restructured Lebanon that is not so Western-oriented as in the past and that supports the Palestinian revolution. Among the more important groups of the Left are the *Murabitun* under the leadership of Ibrahim Qulaylat, who is loyal to Damascus; the Iraqi branch of the Baath party; the Lebanese Communist party; the Syrian Socialist Nationalist party; the Progressive Socialist party (PSP), under the leadership of Walid Junblat, which represents the Druze; remnants of the Lebanese army; the PLO; and al-Amal, the Shiite organization. There is tension among the partners in the National Movement, as the Left calls itself; witness the fighting between al-Amal and pro-Iraqi forces, reflecting the hostility caused by the Iran-Iraq war. Pro-Syrian forces have also attacked pro-Iraqi forces, mirroring the tension between their respective champions.

Particularly crucial to the Left is al-Amal, which is loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The PLO has distanced itself from the leader of the Iranian revolution as Iran moves closer to civil war. As a result, tensions between the PLO and al-Amal have increased. The Shiites are arming themselves rapidly, willing to engage PLO forces, and rumored to be

⁴See Marius Deeb, *The Lebanese Civil War* (New York: Praeger, 1980) for a fuller discussion of the combatants on both sides.



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receiving arms from the Right, and they would probably align themselves with whichever side helps them gain more power.

The Lebanese Front, as the Right calls itself, is also composed of many groups.⁴ The most important are the Phalangists, under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel and his sons, Amin and Bashir; the Free Nationalist party of Camille Chamoun; the Maronite Order of Monks led by Charbel Kassis; the Marada (Giants) of Suleiman Franjeh and factions of the Lebanese army. The Right is committed to a Lebanon that is Western oriented and has the Christian flavor that orientation implies. If possible, it would support the Palestinians only on the political level. Therefore it calls for the control of guerrilla activity on Lebanese soil and the withdrawal of the ADF or the requirement that it become a truly inter-Arab force.

As Syria became supportive of the Left after 1978, cracks within the Rightist alliance appeared. Former President Franjeh, always loyal to the Syrians, broke with the Right in 1978. He has reconciled himself with the traditional Sunni leadership in Tripoli and has carved out with them a territory that is loyal to Syria. In July, 1980, the two strongest factions within the Rightist alliance fought for supremacy, and the Phalangists emerged victorious over the Free Nationalists. In essence, Pierre Gemayel and his son Bashir, leader of the Phalangist militia, rule unchallenged throughout the Rightist-held areas. Israel has supplied the Phalangists with 40 American-made Sherman tanks and has provided extensive training to the Phalangists' 15,000-man force.

Since Beirut is far and away the most important area in Lebanon, it has been the focus of fighting since 1975. In the past year, the capital has been plagued by inter-Arab squabbles, as well as by hostilities between Syria and the Right and the PLO and Israel. Emboldened by its closer ties with Israel, the Right began in 1981 to call for the "liberation" of all Lebanon. The desire to be rid of the Palestinians and the Syrians resulted in heavy fighting in April and May, 1981.

Though the fighting between the PLO and Israel is usually focused in the south where the Palestinian guerrillas are located, the war often erupts in Beirut. The PLO has its command structure in Beirut, its political activities emanate from that city, and several refugee camps are located in the area.

In its ongoing fight with Israel, the PLO had acquired long-range artillery and multiple-barrel Katyushas capable of firing 40 rockets simultaneously, which enabled the PLO to bombard villages in Israel. With both sides escalating the warfare, Israel announced in 1979 that its activities in Lebanon would no longer be retaliatory but rather preemptive.

We are on the offensive. We are the aggressors. We are penetrating the so-called border of the so-called sovereign state of Lebanon and we go after them [the Palestinian guerrillas] wherever they hide.⁵

The violence culminated in the Israeli bombing of West Beirut on July 17, 1981, in a raid that killed 300 people and wounded at least 800 more. This attack on a civilian area severely embarrassed the United States and brought international condemnation of Israel. The administration of President Ronald Reagan reacted by extending the freeze on the shipment of American jets to Israel, a stay that had been imposed because of Israel's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June.

The inability of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's government to end the shelling of northern Israel and the international uproar over its bombing of Beirut left Israel with two unpleasant choices. The first was to repeat the invasion of March, 1978, to stop the PLO. This had not worked in 1978 and presumably would not work in 1981. The second choice was a cease-fire between the PLO and Israel. This was accomplished on July 24 and was even extended to the Syrian-Rightist confrontation. The PLO hailed the cease-fire as an international public relations victory because by agreeing to it Israel indirectly recognized the PLO.

In September and October, 1981, urban terror returned to Beirut in the form of car bombings, mostly in Leftist Beirut, which are apparently directed at the PLO. The Palestinians claim that the terror wave is Israeli-inspired, though no one has claimed responsibility. Thus as 1981 came to a close, tension remained high in Beirut and throughout the country.

Seven years of fighting have taken a tremendous economic toll. The central government is unable to collect taxes on a regular basis and depends on foreign aid from Saudi Arabia, France, the United States, and others. Since 1975, the road system has deteriorated because few roads can be repaired. The government is working with Sweden on the telephone system, which was never good even in the best of times. Supplies of water and electric power are often erratic. The government, however, is operating under difficulties.

The deterioration of the economy has been accelerated by the flight of professionals and technicians, particularly in medicine and merchandising. Yet the Lebanese seem to have money. The foreign powers involved in the fighting pay their forces well. Lebanese abroad continue to remit \$100 million a month. Deposits in Lebanon's banks have grown by one-third in the last three years. Many merchants, their stores destroyed, are still trying to reap advantage from adversity. Push carts filled with goods may be seen as far south as the UNIFIL held area. Small ports controlled by one or another militia collect "tariffs" and allow contraband to enter the country. There is a thriving business in perfume, cigarettes, hashish, guns and stolen cars.

THE BIQA' VALLEY

The international community fears that the fighting in Lebanon will get out of hand, escalate to involve Syria and Israel, cause the failure of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and lead ultimately to a confrontation between the superpowers. Such a sequence almost occurred in the summer of 1981. The crisis began when the Phalangists widened and paved a dirt road from Zahlé westward over the Sannin Mountains, to connect the provincial capital of the Biqa' (Bekaa) Valley with the Rightist heartland on the western side of the mountains.

This was an action the Syrians could not tolerate for a number of reasons. Zahlé was in a Syrian-controlled area and the loss of the town would have been a serious blow to Damascus. Near the city is Riyāq airbase and the town of Shtura, both of which served as headquarters for the Syrian-dominated ADF. Zahlé also overlooked the Beirut-Damascus highway, a critical supply and communications line. Furthermore, control of Zahlé meant control of the Biqa'. The Syrians believe that, for their own defense, they must control the valley because a drive northward through it leads to the Syrian city of Homs, the headquarters of Syrian communications. (Also, in 1973, Israeli jets had flown up the Biqa' before heading east to attack Damascus.) Finally, if the Phalangist plan was successful, the Syrians believed they would be caught in a pincer movement—the Right attacking from the northwest and Israel attacking from the south.

⁵The New York Times, April 18, 1981, p. 3.

The Syrians reacted by surrounding Zahlé on April 1, and throughout the month they attacked the Phalangists above the city. By the end of April, the ADF was able to move the Rightists out of the hills and to concentrate their attention on forcing the Phalangists out of the town. Israel reacted on April 28 by downing two Syrian helicopters. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin argued that he would not allow the Christians to be annihilated in Lebanon; apparently he had been looking for an opportunity to be "tough," to impress the electorate before Israel's June elections.

On April 29, Syria moved three batteries of SAM-6's, surface to air missiles, into the Bika'. Though the missiles are defensive, their position in Lebanon was viewed by the Israelis as a severe escalation of the conflict. Israel feared that the SAM-6's ultimately would be moved into Palestinian areas to protect the PLO and to limit Israel's reconnaissance flights. Syria argued, on the other hand, that the Israeli downing of its helicopters was a violation of the agreement that had allowed Syrian intervention in 1976.

The United States was so worried that activities would escalate into a major war that it dispatched Philip Habib, a retired State Department official, to diffuse the situation. Habib remained in the area for 21 days in May. Crucial to Habib's mission were the Saudis, who were underwriting the costs of the ADF and giving additional foreign aid to Damascus. Saudi pressure on Syria and American leverage on Israel defused the crisis. Habib believed that the real issue was not the missiles but the tension between the Rightists and the Syrians. While urging the Israelis not to attack the SAM's, he worked for a suitable end to the siege of Zahlé, which ended on June 30 after 90 days. Though the Phalangists were able to gain international media coverage, the Syrians seemed to be the winners. They retained control of the Bika', and their missiles are still in place.

The future of Lebanon, at least in the short term, appears bleak. If it were simply a matter of national reconciliation, the problem could perhaps be solved. When it began to lose the civil war, the Right expressed a willingness to increase the power of the Left. In this light, the contacts between the Right and the Shiites are important.

Even a national consensus on the PLO may be emerging. At the Islamic summit meeting in Saudi Arabia in January, 1981, President Elias Sarkis asked the PLO to abide by the Cairo Agreement, arguing that the Palestinian resistance operates only out of Lebanon, that Lebanon is punished by Israel for this, and that "Lebanon is no longer able to bear the death,

destruction and displacement of its people."⁶ Earlier, the President told a group of ambassadors, "If the Palestinian problem is sacred, it is self-evident that Lebanon's unity, integrity, sovereignty and independence is [sic] also sacred. . . ." No Lebanese group opposed either of his statements.

The Palestinians, of course, are not willing to leave Lebanon, their last refuge, unless it means returning to their homeland. In March, 1977, United States President Jimmy Carter called for such a Palestinian entity. And in 1981 as they were returning from President Anwar Sadat's funeral in October, he and former President Gerald Ford urged the Reagan administration to open negotiations with the PLO.

Even if a Palestinian homeland were established and if the Lebanese were reconciled, Lebanon's problems would not end. Israel controls the southern third of the country and has often said that its more natural "boundary" with Lebanon is the Litani River. Israel also controls the skies and the sea lanes and is the protector of the Rightists. Presumably Israel would not give up these advantages unless it could gain something in return.

Israel may also believe that a continuation of the Lebanese conflict is in its best interests. As long as there is conflict in the country, Arab and world attention is diverted from Israel's settlement policy on the West Bank and its annexation of Jerusalem. For Syria, as well, there is some advantage in remaining in Lebanon, because its prestige grows when it is the only Arab country willing to stand up to Israel.

Some Lebanese military leaders are suggesting another solution. Lacking a political settlement, these officers are suggesting that the country should be forcibly united. This seems unlikely. The army would have to be doubled from its current size of 20,000 and it would have to be accepted by all Lebanese. The army is still perceived as basically a Christian militia, an image that was not enhanced in the April, 1981, fighting when some units sided with the Right. Weak, perhaps divided, and with little popular following, the army does not appear to provide an answer.

If one were to ask a Lebanese how he would end the hemorrhaging, he might ask for West European intervention. This does not seem likely either, because of the East European opposition it might cause. Thus Lebanon may well continue in its present state for the foreseeable future. ■

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⁶The New York Times, January 29, 1981, p. A5.

⁷Foreign Broadcast Information Service/Lebanon, January 7, 1981.

EXTREMISM IN IRAN

(Continued from page 13)

Once Ayatollah Khomeini had cast his lot with the extremists, Iran became the scene of a bitter if undeclared civil war between radicals and extremists. During the last six months of 1981, violence and bloodshed became the order of the day, and the Ayatollah found himself losing both popularity and influence.

By the end of 1981, the internecine political conflict in Iran had hardened into internal war in which true believers faced off against one another. In this setting, the future of the country seemed to rest more and more in the hands of some kind of military rule. The disappearance of the moderate center, the increasing anarchy and violence, the worsening economic situation, and the inexperience of the latest round of government leaders brought closer the time when a new authoritarianism would appear in order to prevent the disastrous disintegration of a critically important and venerable member of the community of nations. ■

ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGE

(Continued from page 21)

tional period would be dim. Therefore, Israel is looking beyond the five years as it negotiates the terms of transitional autonomy arrangements.

As for the PLO, the Begin government will resist recognition, probably even mutual recognition, on the grounds that this leopard at least cannot change its spots. The Palestine National Covenant clearly states objectives that are incompatible with the existence of the Israeli state, a point that all Israeli governments have taken most seriously. Consequently, Begin must try to negotiate an agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip with another group, an exceedingly difficult task.

When Saudi Arabia announced a "peace plan" during the summer of 1981, Israel did not find it very encouraging, both because of the content, which was unacceptable, and because of Israel's profound suspicion about Saudi motivation.¹² Although Israel has recognized that Saudi Arabia is not radical as Arab regimes go, Israelis perceive the Saudis as extremely hostile and not constructive in terms of the peace process. In a speech last fall, Foreign Minister Shamir

¹²The eight points include total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines and the creation of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. For the text, see page four of this issue.

¹³Shamir speech, *op. cit.*

¹⁴A comprehensive survey of the history of the relationship may be found in Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979), Book 2.

denounced Saudi Arabia as "one of the major obstacles to the Camp David process for peace" and described Prince Fahd's plan as "a prescription for the dismemberment of Israel, not for peace with Israel."¹³ Israelis would need to see concrete changes in Saudi attitudes before they could begin to take Saudi proposals seriously.

The other main concern of Israeli foreign policy is the relationship with the United States.¹⁴ Although the two countries have considerable affinity for each other, Israel has been concerned for the past several years that the courting of certain Arab countries by the United States will have a deleterious effect on Israel, especially were open warfare to recur, but even in the context of peace negotiations. Begin's response has been to stress Israel's value to the United States as a reliable and valuable ally, as the only democratic country in the region, one which can guarantee stability and policy continuity, and as a military force in the broadest sense, one that could be a most helpful contributor to the realization of American strategic objectives. The challenge to the United States is to find Arab countries other than Egypt that are willing to participate in an informal alliance that includes Israel, despite the hostility that accompanies the local Arab-Israeli conflict. A complication for the United States is that the Egyptians were crucial to the American conception of the strategic alliance; it is too soon to predict whether Mubarak will be as solid a base for the enterprise as his predecessor was thought to be.

For its part, Israel must seek ways to gain the favor of the United States in order to balance the occasions when it antagonizes the American government. The dispute over the United States sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (Awacs) planes to Saudi Arabia is a case in point. Begin felt that his nation's security interests did not allow him to stand idly by while the package went through. Yet although much of the opposition to the sale was inspired by concerns other than the security of Israel, the main responsibility for the opposition was assigned to Israel in the American media and by many government officials, from President Ronald Reagan on down. The heavy commitment of presidential prestige meant that Israel was bound to lose politically, regardless of the outcome in the United States Congress.

In general, Israel under Begin seems committed to doing what it considers necessary in foreign policy, regardless of the costs. This results from an Israeli conviction that other nations do not share the same problems, cannot see things from the same perspective, and may not care even if they understand the issues. Israel's policy continues to be predicated on the belief that its vital security interests are always at risk and that the basic responsibility for defense against those risks is in Israel's own hands. ■

TURKEY'S POLICY IN FLUX

(Continued from page 29)

Its determined effort to be accepted as a friend of the Arabs is in reality a coming to terms with Turkey's historical past.¹²

Arab nationalism, socialism and anti-Westernism developed after World War II; concurrently, Turkey was concerned about the Soviet Union and communism. The preoccupations of Turkey and the Arab states were far apart, with specific differences emerging. For the Arabs, the conflict with Israel assumed highest priority, while for Turkey defense arrangements with the West were paramount. Turkey originally opposed the partition of Palestine; on the other hand, it was the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949. Until the early 1960's, Turkey could not avoid siding with pro-Western Arab states in inter-Arab disputes. Its membership in the Baghdad Pact enraged the radical Arab regimes of Egypt and Syria. The isolation in which Turkey found itself in 1964 over the Cyprus issue hurt most when all the Arab states but Saudi Arabia rejected it, largely because of Turkey's longstanding friendship with Israel. In addition to Cyprus and the United States arms embargo, two additional events pushed Ankara toward a more intimate embrace of the Islamic world: the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the subsequent energy crisis.

Thus in 1976, Turkey hosted the annual Islamic conference, where Rauf Denktaş, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, spoke to the assembled delegates, who in turn endorsed the Turkish position on Cyprus. In return, Turkey announced its willingness to allow the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to open a bureau in Ankara. Full diplomatic recognition of the PLO was not granted until August, 1979, at which time Turkey insisted that the PLO not undertake support of domestic terrorist organizations.

By the time of the 1977 conference in Tripoli, a Turkish resolution favoring a federated Cyprus was

¹²Duygu Bozoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," *Adelphi Papers* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, spring, 1981), pp. 36, 37.

¹³Michael M. Ball, "Turkey Between East and West: The Regional Alternative," *The World Today*, September, 1979, pp. 364-65.

¹⁴At the 1981 Islamic Conference held in Taif, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, for the first time, upgraded its status by sending Prime Minister Bulend Ulusu as representative. It was also at this conference that Turkey took an active role on the Islamic Goodwill Mission which was created for the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the Iraq-Iran conflict.

¹⁵An agreement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia was signed in 1978 for a \$250 million loan. Also in early 1981 an additional loan agreement was consummated for \$57 million. Turkey has a five-year grace period and will then be charged an interest rate of only 2.5 percent annually.

overwhelmingly passed, with Algeria, Lebanon and Syria in opposition. In return, Turkey, which had previously taken a neutral position on the Arab-Israeli dispute, tilted toward the Arabs. In 1977, also, Turkey voted with the Arab states on the United Nations resolution condemning Zionism. With these actions, Turkey removed the points of conflicts that separated it from the Arab states. It steadily cooled its relations with Israel without completely severing diplomatic ties. In December, 1980, Turkey lowered the status of its diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv and asked Israel to do the same in Ankara, so that a second secretary was made the chargé d'affaires. Furthermore, Turkey called for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, including the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to statehood.

It is important to note that these political developments were taking place at a time when Turkey's economy was in severe straits and was beginning to stagnate. Its dependency on Arab oil, which amounts to about 90 percent of its consumption, was clearly a vital variable in its rapprochement with the Islamic world. In other words, Turkish leaders viewed the Islamic states as economic alternatives to Ankara's dependence on financial assistance from the West.¹³ Their objectives were several: to secure oil, if possible, on easy payment terms; to attract some petrodollars for investment in Turkey; and to increase Turkish exports to the oil-producing Arab countries. On the eve of the seventh Islamic conference (1976) in Istanbul, the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* reported that Turkey favored an Islamic Common Market.¹⁴ In fact, in both the tenth (1979) and eleventh (1980) Islamic conferences, held in Morocco and India respectively, the Turkish proposals to strengthen consultative and economic cooperation among the member countries were unanimously adopted. These proposals culminated in an economic conference held in Ankara in November, 1980, when delegates from 24 Islamic nations approved a sweeping plan for cooperation in the areas of trade, industry, tourism and energy. However, it seems very doubtful that Turkey could fully participate in an Islamic Common Market, since Ankara is an associate member of the EEC and is seeking full membership in the Common Market.

Turkey's share of trade with its new Middle East partners increased from 9 percent in the mid-1960's to over 15 percent by 1981. Iraq and Libya hold special significance for Turkey. Since 1977, both countries are major sources of oil. Today, Turkey obtains nearly 50 percent of its oil from Iraq and about 30 percent from Libya. Lesser amounts are imported from Iran and Saudi Arabia. In fact, Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have extended credit and loans to Ankara to help it pay for its energy requirements.¹⁵

Negotiations among Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United States are now taking place in the defense area. Saudi Arabia is to underwrite a program in which Turkey, with the technical assistance of the United States, will coassemble F-16's and will assist the Saudis in providing training for military personnel, plus the refurbishing of Saudi aircraft. This assistance will permit Turkey to secure F-16's at costs that are underwritten by Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia intends to assist Turkey for the sake of regional stability. This is a necessity in light of the internal chaos that prevails in Iran, which could directly affect the entire region. A fundamentalist Islamic state next to Turkey would encourage pro-Islamic forces to more overt activities, and this would add a new dimension to internal polarization. The Iraq-Iran war also contributes to the instability of the area. In fact, both Turkey and Saudi Arabia serve on the Islamic Goodwill Mission, which was created by the Islamic conference to seek a solution between the warring parties.

Ankara's relations with Syria, its neighbor to the south, are correct but distant. Several sources of discord exist. The Turkish province of Hatay (Alexandretta) is claimed by Syria from time to time. In addition, Syria's radical secular regime has funneled arms to and supported Turkish rebels, and Syria's close relations with the Soviet Union work against normal relations.

The Libyan connection that developed after the 1975 United States arms embargo is an important source of financial assistance for Turkey: an energy source at concessionary prices, millions of dollars in grants, and the employment of some 60,000 Turkish construction workers. Libyan aid exceeded \$2 billion by the end of 1981. High-level diplomatic visitations have taken place throughout this period. More recently, "political and economic solidarity" was reaffirmed by Libya's Foreign Minister Abd al-Ati al'Ibaydi when he visited Ankara in May, 1981. Libyan-Turkish cooperation also extends to the military sphere. During the Cyprus dispute, Libya transferred to the Turkish Air Force five F-5's (including spare parts) and, more recently, Libyan officers are being trained by Turkey. In addition, Turkey has sold small arms and naval vessels to Libya and is assisting it in the construction of several military installations.¹⁶

¹⁶Also, high-level military delegations have exchanged visits. Recently, Turkey Air Force Commander General Tashin Sahinkaya visited Tripoli. A reciprocal visit took place by Libya's Colonel Salah al-Farjani. See *FBIS*, vol. 7, no. 120 (June 23, 1981).

¹⁷These issues continue to plague Turkey's relations with Libya. See interview with Libya's Foreign Minister in *FBIS*, volume 7, no. 104 (June 1, 1981).

¹⁸Michael M. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 363.

¹⁹Interviews conducted in Ankara at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 28, 1981.

And yet, the Libyan and Iraqi connections have come with a price tag. Not only did Libya press Turkey on the Palestinian issue, it has also attempted to weaken Turkey's ties with NATO. In fact, both Libya and Iraq have threatened to make future aid to Ankara conditional on further neutralization of Turkey's defense policy.¹⁷ Libya's Colonel Muammar Qaddafi stated in July, 1978:

We want to draw closer to Turkey, but because of the Atlantic Pact, it has not been possible. The Arabs and the Third World countries are suspicious because they fear they might come close to the Atlantic Pact countries. For this reason, the only thing our Turkish brethren can do is to leave the alliance.¹⁸

This statement raises basic questions regarding the use of American and NATO bases in Turkey for airlift and staging posts. Although the possibility of Soviet military moves aimed at the Gulf regions would be threatening to Turkey, it seems likely that involvement would be exercised through a proxy. If this were to occur, it is probable that the United States would intervene overtly with force. In this case, Turkey would find itself in a predicament about what to do if the United States, for example, wanted to use the air base at Incirlik as a staging area. As one official indicated, "Turkey would most likely look the other way" in such a situation and permission would probably be granted on "a case by case basis."¹⁹ Such an eventuality would undermine the newly founded Turkish-Islamic rapprochement.

Turkey entered the decade of the 1980's with a far more balanced set of regional and international policy objectives. Its experiences taught it not to trust the superpowers; its neighbor to the north is viewed with great suspicion and uncertainty, while its relations with Washington have left in their wake much bitterness and mistrust. There is, however, no doubt that Turkey's affinities and aspirations still rest with Europe and the United States. Ideologically, Ankara continues to face West, although Western influence has lessened. Most especially this applies to the United States, General Evren and the National Security Council's protestations notwithstanding. In fact, discord between Turkey and the United States may persist and become more acute if the outstanding issues with Greece are not settled amicably. ■

EGYPT AFTER SADAT

(Continued from page 8)

President Mubarak may need such forces if, like his predecessor, he tries to accomplish too much during a period of destabilizing transition. Much has been written about the excesses of Egypt's upper classes. As I see it, the rampant materialism that the Muslim fundamentalists find objectionable would be less offensive if the wealth that finds its way into the hands

of the newly rich were channeled into productive, job-generating investments to foster rural development and to reduce urban poverty. ■

JORDAN AND ARAB POLARIZATION

(Continued from page 25)

defend itself against accusations of betrayal. Although Jordan's posture may enhance the PLO's international stature, the risks are manageable. Because of the local balance of political forces, Hussein does not greatly fear the possibility of a PLO-led, Soviet-supported independent ministate in the West Bank and Gaza.

Even if Israel were not determined to prevent such an irredentist-prone entity, Hussein apparently believes that if serious negotiations about returning the West Bank to Arab sovereignty begin, the Palestinian people will be represented not by Marxist intellectuals from Beirut but rather by the middle-class, family notables of the West Bank; the middle- and upper middle-class Palestinians of the East Bank; and the Hashemite and East Bank aristocracy itself.

King Hussein's enthusiastic encouragement of the Middle East diplomacy of the European Community (EC) also fits this strategy. No matter how much EC statements enrage the Israelis, the Community has never eschewed explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist and is not likely to do so. The Community has refused to recognize the PLO as the "sole" Palestinian representative and has not, as a group, called for a separate Palestinian national state. The EC's insistence on the mutual recognition of Israeli and Palestinian rights is a demand that no group within the PLO can now meet and one that most PLO groups will never accept.¹³ It is in Jordan's interest to push this choice on the PLO, for it either encourages the would-be moderates to associate with Jordan or forces the PLO to move itself out of the diplomatic mainstream, to Jordan's benefit. Jordan's attitude toward the PLO and the EC initiative was voiced by

¹³There is a great deal of debate about whether the PLO, or part of it, is truly moderate and does not find it wise to say so in public or whether it is not yet moderate even in private. This author holds the view that the moderate/radical split that can be found between various Arab countries is not yet evident within the PLO. The seeds are doubtlessly there, but their prospects for growth are still uncertain.

¹⁴FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa), January 23, 1981, p. F1.

¹⁵See *The Military Balance, 1980-81* (London: IISS, 1980), pp. 44-48.

¹⁶Well over half of Jordan's budget comes from foreign sources, close to 80 percent if the military budget is included. The majority of this assistance nowadays comes from Iraq. See Sol W. Sanders, "What Jordan Hopes To Gain by Its Alliance with Iraq," *Business Week*, November 10, 1980, and *Middle East Executive Reports*, September, 1981, p. 9.

Crown Prince Hassan in January, 1981. Asked about the need for the PLO fully to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign state, Hassan answered:

Yes, we are having trouble in promoting moderation within the ranks of the PLO. They must be brought to accept the credibility of the Venice declaration as a whole; they must evolve. . . .¹⁴

CURRENT AND FUTURE PROBLEMS

Although Jordan seems to have developed a sensible diplomatic strategy to advance its interests, many problems persist. With respect to its basic design to moderate and co-opt the PLO, the verdict is not yet in. The cycle of radicalization that has hit the region since Camp David and the Iranian revolution has made its goal more difficult. Moreover, Jordan's association with the Iraqi-led coalition of the Baghdad Summit has led predictably to a worsening of relations with Syria. Since the summer of 1980, tension between the two countries has threatened periodically to erupt in large-scale violence. This was especially evident in December, 1980, and again in August, 1981, following the cease-fire in Lebanon. This worries Jordan very much, for while the Syrian military is thinly spread, a marked disparity in military force, especially air power, favors the Soviet-supplied Syrians.¹⁵

Even Jordan's apparent wealth and economic health carry with them many problems. The flood of foreign money into a country with so little inherent wealth has spurred inflation and made it difficult for the government to keep up with the private sector in attracting quality personnel for the army and the civil service. Even more ominous, Iraq, Jordan's main benefactor, is involved in a protracted war with Iran that has greatly slowed Iraqi oil exports and revenue collection. As Iraq's own financial situation deteriorates, Baghdad can less easily afford its generosity to Jordan.

This is a far cry from Jordan's expectation when it assertively supported Iraq in its war against Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini regime in September, 1980. Hussein apparently hoped that Iraq could quickly overthrow Khomeini, thus stemming the tide of the Islamic fundamentalist revival and the advance of Soviet interests in the Persian Gulf. In any case, with so much of Jordan's budget at stake¹⁶ and with logic dictating that, without a port on the Gulf, Jordan would either have to help or, in effect, betray Iraq, Hussein had little choice. But if the destabilizing effects of the Gulf war seep into Jordan, it could prove dangerous. Aside from the financial stress, with predictable effects on the level of foreign investment, Hussein could lose control over the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwa), with whom he has a cautious and limited working relationship.

Last, but certainly not least, Jordan faces problems

with Israel. The results of the June, 1981, Israeli elections, which resulted in the reelection of Menachem Begin at the head of an even harder-line coalition, bode ill for the prospects of a peace that could satisfy Jordanian interests. The King and other members of the Jordanian political establishment also fear an attempt by Israel either to force another wave of refugees on Jordan or, in a general war, to seize the East Bank temporarily with the objective of replacing the Hashemites with compliant Palestinians, thus "solving" the Palestinian issue at Jordan's expense.¹⁷ More generally, the current Israeli government creates problems for Jordan because its actions and its attitudes make Jordan's efforts to moderate Arab political tendencies more difficult. This includes Israeli administrative practices in the occupied territories that have (inadvertently) aided the PLO and reduced Jordanian influence.¹⁸ True moderates, willing to accept Israel, must face the question from the radicals: given Israel's attitude, what is there to gain from moderation and political solutions that cannot be gained from armed struggle?

What of Jordan's relations with the United States? Ideally Hussein wants Washington to help him fob off Arab radicalism and to co-opt and control the PLO. To do this, Washington must lean harder on Israel so that Arab moderates will have something to show for their moderation. In Jordan's view, Washington must also encourage PLO moderation directly by engaging in old-fashioned, hardheaded carrot-and-stick diplomacy. Quiet coordination with Jordan would not hurt.

This may be what Hussein wants, but he is not optimistic about the chances of getting it. Despite an initial improvement with the Ronald Reagan administration, United States-Jordanian relations have again fallen into disrepair over the American response—totally inadequate in Amman's view—to the Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear installations and its raids into Lebanon, and over the new Israeli-United States "strategic relationship." The Israeli mission against Iraq maximally violated Jordanian airspace—Israeli aircraft traversed the entire width of the country—thus depicting the King as an accomplice or inept. The very mild hand slap administered by Washington to Israel, coupled with Jordan's continued inability to purchase a modern air defense system from the United

States, occasioned much frustration. The American "strategic relationship" with Israel runs directly counter to Jordan's hopes for its relationship with the United States. Only specific United States-Jordanian "institutional" arrangements, like the biannual Joint Military Commission, and Hussein's even greater suspicion of Moscow and its local clients keep United States-Jordanian ties alive. Still, despite state visits and laudatory speeches,¹⁹ Hussein is unlikely to switch sides and befriend the Soviet Union, even if Jordan accepts limited military purchases from the U.S.S.R. Nor is full and genuine neutrality an option for a weak state in a polarized Middle East.

Jordanians hope that Washington will acknowledge the logic of the moderate Arab argument and recognize that United States interests in the region cannot survive everlasting support for Israeli occupation of the West Bank. In the meantime, Jordan will continue to take a keen interest in Palestinian political evolution and in the fissures of the Arab and Islamic worlds, as well as the Mideast diplomacy of the superpowers. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 4)

agreements, and to prevent the Saudis from backing away from their working agreements on the assumption that cooperation with the United States in the Middle East is bad for one's health.

Despite Sadat's great popularity in the United States, after his assassination it was widely suggested that neither the United States nor the Egyptian government knew what was really going on in Egypt and that our assessment of Sadat's leadership was not shared by the Egyptian people. The State Department continued to issue statements insisting on Egypt's stable and democratic character as well as American confidence that Egypt under Mubarak would follow Sadat's policies. Considerable attention was focused on external threats and the possibility that Libya was preparing to take advantage of the troubled situation in Egypt, if it had not already been responsible for the assassination itself. In spite of this posturing, it was difficult not to notice the sighs of relief that emanated from many quarters after the requisite grieving was done.

The United States had come to take Egypt for granted some time before, but in recent months we had come to the conclusion that our close association with Egypt had begun to produce diminishing returns. As the Camp David process drew to a close, it became clearer that it had only produced a separate peace between Egypt and Israel. Egypt had failed to open a bridge between Israel and the moderate Arab states, and Israel had failed to make any promising concession on the Palestine question. The Camp

¹⁷The King has recently given public expression to this concern. See FBIS, *Daily Report* (Middle East and Africa) September 9, 1981, p. F2.

¹⁸See Mark Heller, "Politics and Social Change in the West Bank Since 1967," in Joel S. Migdal, ed., *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), especially pp. 195-99.

¹⁹King Hussein praised the Soviet Middle East "Initiative" both when it was announced in February, 1981, at the Soviet Communist party Congress and again in May when Hussein visited the Soviet Union.

David agreements had served as the centerpiece of President Carter's Middle East policy, but even he had begun to look beyond April, 1982. The Reagan administration subsequently came to the conclusion that further progress in peacemaking and in strengthening American influence in the region could not be achieved through supporting Egypt in its disagreements with the other Arab states. Egypt had little leverage over Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon or Jordan. It faces enormous economic problems, and its strategic interests are linked to the Suez Canal, the Nile, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. It could contribute to regional defense by providing bases or by allowing the use of its military facilities, but it was not likely that Egypt would be able to serve as the vehicle of American regional hegemony even if substantial concessions on Palestinian autonomy were wrung from Israel.

As a consequence of such calculations, Egypt was downgraded in United States Middle East policy. There were delays in the shipment of weapons. The autonomy negotiations with Israel were allowed to languish. The Reagan administration seemed inclined to reduce the amount or slow down the rate of delivery of economic assistance. There was even some risk that the next phase of negotiations on the Arab-Israeli dispute might proceed without Egyptian involvement and would thus confirm Egypt's isolation. A low point was reached during President Sadat's visit to the United States, when he failed to win promises of increased military and economic support, when he ruffled official feelings by calling for United States recognition of the PLO, and when he failed to get any United States commitment to pressure Israel. Sadat had become more impatient, frustrated and strident as the expected reward for his enormous gamble continued to elude him.

Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's closest collaborator (aside from his old cronies, Osman Ahmed Osman and Saiyid Mare'i), inherited control of the elaborate apparatus of the Egyptian state and therewith a number of nearly insurmountable problems. American policy toward Egypt is not likely to change. As Mubarak demonstrates that he is in control, and as we put Libya's intentions and capabilities in perspective, we are no longer inclined to believe that the situation calls for drastic action. We are likely to follow the French initiative in attempting to defuse the tension in Chad. The two Awacs planes sent to Egypt to detect hostile Libyan action were quickly withdrawn. The November, 1981, demonstration of the presence of American forces in Egypt was toned down. The reduction of foreign aid, including development and planning funds, for Egypt (and for the Egyptian intellectual elite) continues unabated.

President Mubarak is pledged to follow the Camp David process through all its agreed phases. He has

already indicated that he will try to improve relations with the other Arab states, and some of those states, frightened at the prospect of a fundamentalist Islamic revolution in Egypt, are willing to give him the benefit of the doubt through the spring of 1982, when Israel is to withdraw from the last section of Sinai. Beyond that time, for Mubarak to persist in Sadat's recent posture would be to remain at a dead end. Nor is Mubarak likely to consider some defiantly anti-American or anti-Saudi action. Egypt and Israel are both aware of the pressures driving them apart, but they are likely to persist in this last phase. The Egyptian government is determined to suffer any difficulty in order to redeem its Sinai territory. Israel will go through with its part of the bargain because of the American commitment to station neutral forces in the Sinai, between Egypt and Israel, thus guaranteeing the peace. Should the United States waver in its commitment, the results are likely to be disastrous.

POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Since the return of the American hostages, American interest in Iran has greatly declined. Iran has been mentioned in official discourse only indirectly in connection with events in Egypt, in a comparison with the situation in Saudi Arabia, and as a possible source of danger to the Saudi oilfields. The continued military stalemate between Iran and Iraq and the escalation of revolutionary terror as the traditional clergy and the fundamentalists continue their struggle for power have made Iran seem less of a danger to its neighbors. American fears about the future role of Iran in the Gulf have been somewhat calmed by the absence of any evidence at this writing that the Soviet Union has gained influence in Teheran. The State Department does not seem to believe that the Iranian revolution can be exported.

The United States has accepted the idea that, after the conclusion of the hostage affair, a period of détente is necessary before a rapprochement can be attempted. Our policy toward revolutionary Iran has, therefore, become one of benign neglect, meanwhile arming Saudi Arabia, befriending Iraq, strengthening Pakistan, smuggling arms to the Afghan rebels, and warning the Soviet Union against attempting any adventure in Iran. We have maintained an all but humiliating silence on the repressive policies of the government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the violent efforts to overthrow the Ayatollah.

Ultimately, Iran's internal strife and Iran's war with Iraq will be brought to a close. Iran will then be likely to make its presence felt in the Gulf—with or without Soviet backing. The United States has not thought through the new security regime in the Gulf so it is not yet clear what role Iran might play in future United States policy. In the meantime, the Saudis have tried to set up their own Council of Arab

states concerned with the security of the Gulf, but that group excludes Iraq. It remains to be seen whether Iran and Iraq can both be kept out of a security arrangement for the Gulf even if the United States and Saudi Arabia wish to exclude them.

The rationale for our emerging Middle East policy is to prevent the Soviet Union from challenging American political predominance in the region. We do not wish to share power or responsibility in the region with the Soviet Union. We should like to make sure that the countries allied with the Soviets switch to our camp or are prevented from exercising any influence beyond their boundaries. We are inclined to believe that countries that follow the Iranian path of Islamic revolution, detaching themselves from close cooperation with the United States, become vulnerable to Soviet influence. We should like to see a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute, but we do not wish to pursue such a solution in an international forum in which the Soviet Union would enjoy equal status with us. We believe that sooner or later the Soviet Union will seek access to the petroleum resources of the Middle East and that Soviet leaders are likely to try to protect commercial access by political and/or military access. We believe that eventually they will try to restrict American access to Middle East oil and that they will encourage a damaging embargo of the capitalist West if possible.

A military confrontation with the Soviet Union is not thought to be imminent, but it is generally acknowledged that the United States does not have strong enough forces in the region to carry out any but the most symbolic of operations. Consequently, any Soviet threat in the Middle East will have to be met in some other place and in some other way. Soviet leaders are likely to continue to be cautious and to try to exploit indigenous forces opposed to the United States or alienated from existing regimes. Nevertheless, if they are faced with the loss of allies and bases in the Middle East, they are not likely to remain passive. The defense of our position in the Middle East and the expansion of our regional hegemony require strategic support from more remote geographical areas. Despite the policies enunciated by President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the military dimension of our Middle East policy has not yet become the highest priority. If and when it does, however, it will be apparent that NATO and our European allies will play an important role. From this perspective, European interest in a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute and the set of Greek-Turkish disagreements over Cyprus and the Aegean will have to be taken into account.

Before the Senate vote on the Awacs sale, our European allies indicated their lack of confidence in United States Middle East policy by calling for alternatives to the Camp David agreements. Their primary

concern remains the security of their oil supply. Just as some Europeans feel that United States strategic weapons policy leaves Europe more exposed to Soviet medium-range retaliation, so some feel that United States Middle East policy may leave them more exposed to an oil embargo that may be the result of Arab dissatisfaction with American policy. The improvement of United States relations with Saudi Arabia, the more balanced attitude of French President François Mitterrand, and the beginning of an American search for a post-Camp David "game plan" will probably reduce the differences between the United States and its European allies. Nevertheless, the Europeans do not wish to appear simply to be following the American lead.

A most important test of United States-European cooperation will come on the question of whether some allies will share responsibility for monitoring the Sinai border after April, 1982. Since the United States has not yet worked out a way to link the Saudi plan and United Nations Resolution 242 to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, it is premature to expect the Europeans to fall in line with United States policy. If and when we work out a formula, it is to be expected that they will press for something closer to the Fahd plan calling for full Israeli withdrawal from the territories taken in 1967. Again, France appears more likely to take a moderate position.

The Greek-Turkish conflict has been a source of considerable difficulty and embarrassment to the United States both with regard to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) policy and with regard to Middle East policy. The results of the Greek elections, bringing to power the Socialist party led by Andreas Papandreou, will increase pressure on the United States to take a more explicit position on the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. Papandreou has also called for a policy statement from NATO on its attitude toward armed conflict between two NATO members and, in particular, its attitude toward the use of NATO weapons in such a conflict. The American dilemma is made more difficult because Turkey is clearly of greater strategic importance than Greece, and it is far stronger militarily. Still, the Turkish position would be gravely weakened by Greek withdrawal from NATO. Turkish nationalism, especially significant during the current constitutional crisis, will not allow the Turkish government to accept serious interference in its Aegean policy. Thus the Turks have all but forced the United States to accept Turkey's de facto partition of Cyprus and to continue to support the Turkish military elite as the guarantors of the security and the legitimacy of Turkey.

The virtually official visit of PLO leader Yasir Arafat to Japan is said to reflect Japan's extreme dependence on Arab oil and its desire to please the

(Continued on page 48)

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of November, 1981, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Nov. 25—In Fez, Morocco, the heads of state of the Arab League end their meeting after 4 hours to avoid open discord over the Saudi 8-point peace plan. Syrian President Hafez Assad, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi do not attend the meeting.

Arms Control

Nov. 30—U.S. and Soviet negotiators meet in Geneva to begin talks on reducing nuclear arms in Europe.

European Economic Community (EEC)

Nov. 27—The EEC leaders end their 2-day meeting without agreement; they refer the problem of financing the EEC to the foreign ministers; Britain and West Germany claim that they pay a disproportionate share of the costs.

Gulf Unity Conference

Nov. 11—The six members of the Gulf Unity Conference meet in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and agree to support the Saudi peace plan for the Middle East; representatives from Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates attend the meeting.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

(See *India; Poland*)

Middle East

Nov. 2—Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd says that his 8-point peace plan for the Middle East is a "balanced, reasonable alternative" to the Camp David process and that a Palestinian state under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization is essential to his plan.

Nov. 5—After 3 days in Saudi Arabia, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington calls the Saudi plan a "serious" way to negotiate peace.

Nov. 11—In Cairo, Egyptian and Israeli negotiators resume talks on Palestinian autonomy.

Nov. 23—France, Britain, Italy and the Netherlands agree to participate in the peacekeeping force for the Sinai after the Israeli withdrawal in April, 1982.

Nov. 27—In Washington, D.C., Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir meets U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. to discuss the makeup of the peacekeeping force; Israel objects to the participation of EEC troops because some EEC nations have endorsed the Saudi peace proposal.

Nov. 28—Egypt agrees to an Israeli request to postpone Palestinian autonomy talks scheduled to resume December 2.

Nov. 29—U.S. special envoy to the Middle East Philip Habib arrives in Beirut; he is also expected to visit Syria, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Nov. 30—In Washington, D.C., Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sign a memorandum of understanding that will "enhance strategic cooperation [between Israel and

the U.S.] to deter all threats" to the Middle East by "the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region." The U.S. Senate does not need to ratify the memorandum.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See *Greece; Spain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

(See *Chad*)

United Nations

(See also *Afghanistan*)

Nov. 11—The island nation of Antigua and Barbuda, which became independent of Great Britain on November 1, becomes the 157th U.N. member.

AFGHANISTAN

Nov. 23—A spokesman for the U.N. World Food Program says his agency will send an additional \$12.2 million in emergency food aid for the 1.7 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

ANGOLA

(See *South Africa*)

ARGENTINA

Nov. 21—Interior Minister General Horacio Tomás Liendo is sworn in as Acting President to replace President Roberto Eduardo Viola, who stepped down temporarily because of ill health yesterday.

BANGLADESH

Nov. 15—Acting President Abdus Sattar wins the nationwide presidential election; all 25 opponents, including Awami League candidate Kamal Hossain, are defeated overwhelmingly.

BELGIUM

Nov. 9—Final results in yesterday's parliamentary elections give the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Liberals an almost equal number of seats in the 212-member Chamber of Representatives.

Nov. 24—King Baudouin asks Flemish Liberal party leader Willy de Clerq to form a new Cabinet.

Nov. 30—De Clerq reports that he is unable to form a coalition Cabinet.

BRAZIL

Nov. 12—President João Baptista Figueiredo returns to office after recuperating from a heart attack.

BURMA

Nov. 9—Parliament selects U San Yu to succeed President Ne Win, who has resigned because of ill health; Ne Win will remain chairman of the Burma Socialist Program party.

CANADA

Nov. 5—Meeting in Ottawa with Prime Minister Pierre

Elliott Trudeau, 9 of the 10 provincial prime ministers agree on a new constitution; Quebec's prime minister René Lévesque continues to oppose it.

Nov. 19—Prime Minister Trudeau presents the resolution on a new constitution to Parliament.

Nov. 25—The Quebec cabinet vetoes the proposed constitutional accord reached by the federal government and the 9 other provinces. Lévesque asks Trudeau to delay action in the House of Commons because of Quebec's opposition.

CHAD

Nov. 1—A spokesman for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) says that an OAU peacekeeping force will begin operations before December 31 to fill the vacuum created when President Goukouni Oueddei ordered Libyan troops to leave the country on October 28.

Nov. 4—Commander of Libyan troops in Chad Colonel Radwan Salah says all Libyan troops will be out of the country in one week.

Nov. 17—OAU peacekeeping force commander General G. O. Ejiga of Nigeria arrives for talks with President Goukouni. Ejiga will head the peacekeeping unit made up of soldiers from Nigeria, Zaire, Senegal, Benin, Togo and Guinea.

Nov. 29—In Ndjamena, a contingent of Senegalese troops arrives to take up peacekeeping duties.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 22—At the conclusion of a 4-day visit to Beijing, former U.S. Vice President Walter F. Mondale says that the proposed U.S. sale of military equipment to Taiwan has created "a very delicate moment" in U.S.-Chinese relations.

Nov. 23—It is announced that the Communist party's Central Committee and the government have agreed to create more jobs by encouraging private business to develop alongside collective enterprises.

DENMARK

Nov. 12—Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen's Social Democratic government fails to win parliamentary approval of its economic program; special elections for a new government will be held December 8.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 3—Interior Minister Mohammed Nabawi Ismail tells the Cabinet that more than 700 Muslim fundamentalists have been arrested in the continuing investigation of the October assassination of President Anwar Sadat.

Nov. 8—Over nationwide television and radio, President Hosni Mubarak addresses Parliament for the 1st time since becoming President.

Nov. 12—Military prosecutor general Major General Hamed Hammouda announces that 14 people have been indicted for the murder of President Sadat and 20 others have been accused of conspiring to murder.

Nov. 25—President Mubarak orders the release from jail of 31 political leaders, including former *Al-Ahram* editor Mohammed Hassanein Heikal; in September the 31 were arrested and detained by President Sadat.

EL SALVADOR

Nov. 9—In response to recent statements by U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr., President José Napoleón Duarte says that the civil war is not "stalemated"; he

says his country needs economic assistance and will require military assistance only if the guerrillas receive foreign military aid.

Nov. 10—The U.N. Human Rights Commission reports more than 11,000 political murders in El Salvador in the 1st 9 months of this year.

FRANCE

(See *India*)

GERMANY, WEST

(See *U.S.S.R.*)

GREECE

Nov. 24—By a vote of 172 to 113, Parliament approves Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou's proposals to revoke the 1980 agreement in which Greece joined the military wing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to demand the withdrawal of nuclear arms from Greece, and to set a schedule for the U.S. withdrawal from military bases in Greece.

HONDURAS

Nov. 30—Liberal party candidate Robert Suazo Córdova wins yesterday's nationwide presidential election with 54 percent of the vote; National party candidate Ricardo Zúñiga Augustinus wins about 42 percent of the vote.

INDIA

Nov. 9—The International Monetary Fund approves a record \$5.8-billion loan to help India pay for its imported oil.

Nov. 14—In Paris, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi meets with French President François Mitterrand; Gandhi is negotiating to purchase French Mirage fighter bombers.

IRAN

Nov. 2—Newly selected Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi presents his 21-member Cabinet to Parliament.

Nov. 29—Iranian and Iraqi news services report intensive fighting between Iraqi and Iranian forces in Khuzistan province.

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Arab League; Iran*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Nov. 4—The Defense Ministry closes Bir Zeit University in the occupied area of the West Bank because of recent anti-Israeli demonstrations by Palestinian students.

Nov. 9—Defense Minister Ariel Sharon says Israel will take military action in Lebanon if diplomatic efforts to remove the Syrian missiles do not succeed.

Nov. 17—In Beirut, a Palestine Liberation Organization spokesman claims responsibility for the critical wounding of moderate Palestinian West Bank leader Yusuf al-Khatib and the death of his son Kazem.

JAPAN

Nov. 30—Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki addresses his, newly reorganized Cabinet; 5 of the 20 former Cabinet ministers are retained.

JORDAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

LEBANON

(See *Israel*)

LIBYA

(See also *Intl. Arab League; Chad*)

- Nov. 2—In Washington, D.C., State Department spokesman Dean Fischer acknowledges that U.S. citizens have been supplying military support services for the Libyan air force.
- Nov. 12—In New York, a spokesman for the Exxon Corporation says it plans to close all its oil and gas production facilities in Libya.
- Nov. 28—Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi announces the formation of a Libyan rapid deployment force to counteract any action taken by the U.S. in any Arab country.

NAMIBIA (South-West Africa)

- Nov. 19—South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) leader Sam Nujoma says SWAPO will accept the Western proposals to guarantee white minority rights in an independent Namibia.

NETHERLANDS

- Nov. 21—In Amsterdam, more than 300,000 people demonstrate their opposition to the deployment of nuclear missiles in West Europe.

NEW ZEALAND

- Nov. 28—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held. Election officials say that incomplete returns give the National party 46 seats in the 92-seat House of Representatives; the opposition Labor party wins 44 seats. Absentee ballots will delay the final count until mid-December.

NICARAGUA

- Nov. 6—*Nuevo Diario*, a pro-government newspaper, publishes the names of 13 people who, it claims, are U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents currently working for the U.S. embassy in Managua.
- Nov. 22—U.S. Secretary of State Haig says that "the hours are growing rather short" to stop the Nicaraguan government from its "drift toward totalitarianism."
- Nov. 23—In Mexico City, Haig says that there is some evidence that Soviet-made MiG's have arrived in Cuba for reshipment to Nicaragua.
- Nov. 25—In Washington, D.C., a State Department official says that Mexico has agreed to discuss with Sandinista officials joint U.S.-Mexican concerns about Nicaragua.
- Nov. 26—In Mexico City, Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann arrives for talks with Mexican officials.

POLAND

- Nov. 2—Following 3 weeks of wildcat labor strikes in southern Poland, more than 100,000 workers return to work.
- Nov. 4—Communist party leader and Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Archbishop Jozef Glemp and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa meet in Warsaw for the 1st time.
- Nov. 10—The government officially applies for membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
- Nov. 12—More than 200,000 factory workers in the western provinces end a 22-day wildcat strike. More than 250,000 workers remain on strike across the country.
- Nov. 23—15 prominent members of Solidarity resign from

the union to protest Solidarity's "too conciliatory stand."

- Nov. 27—Jaruzelski announces over nationwide radio that the Politburo has asked the government to enact legislation banning strikes. Last summer, the government acknowledged the union's right to strike.

SAUDI ARABIA

(See *Intl. Middle East*)

SEYCHELLES

- Nov. 26—President France Albert René announces that his armed forces have put down a coup attempt by more than 100 mercenary soldiers, most of whom are members of the South African Defense Force or former Rhodesian soldiers. Some of the rebels hijack an Air India jet to South Africa, where they are arrested.

SOUTH AFRICA

- Nov. 4—Registered Indian voters in the Transvaal, Cape and Natal provinces boycott elections for the South African Indian Council, an advisory body with no legislative powers.
- Nov. 9—A Defense Ministry spokesman acknowledges that South African air force planes shot down an Angolan MiG-21 over Angolan territory in "self-defense."
- Nov. 27—Security police arrest black trade union leaders in several cities; they are held under indefinite detention. Students and political activists thought to have ties with the banned African National Congress are also detained.

SPAIN

- Nov. 4—To protest the coalition government's conservative policies, 15 members of the Social Democratic party resign their parliamentary seats.
- Nov. 21—Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo takes over as president of the Union of the Democratic Center party; party president Augustin Rodríguez Sahugún resigned under pressure after the Social Democrats withdrew from Parliament.
- Nov. 26—The Senate votes 106 to 60 to support the government's proposal to join NATO.

SUDAN

- Nov. 9—President Gaafar Nimeiry dismisses his Cabinet and announces new economic austerity measures.
- Nov. 24—President Nimeiry appoints a new Cabinet, including many who served in the previous Cabinet; Finance Minister Badr al-Din Sulayman is not reappointed.

SWEDEN

- Nov. 1—In Stockholm, Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten meets with Soviet Ambassador Mikhail D. Kayovlev to discuss Swedish insistence on questioning the captain of the Soviet submarine stranded near a restricted Swedish naval base since October 27.
- Nov. 2—Swedish authorities question the commander of the Soviet submarine, who insists that he entered Swedish waters because of a faulty compass.
- Nov. 5—Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin says that the government has completed questioning the Soviet submarine commander and that the submarine "most likely carried nuclear warheads."
- Nov. 6—The Soviet submarine leaves Swedish waters and rejoins a Soviet flotilla.

SYRIA(See also *Intl, Arab League*)

- Nov. 9—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held.
- Nov. 11—Official election returns give President Hafez Assad's Socialist Baath party 60 percent of the seats; the Communist party loses all 8 seats it held in the previous Parliament.
- Nov. 29—In Damascus, a car bomb explodes outside a school, killing 90 people and wounding 135. President Assad blames the Muslim Brotherhood, although a spokesman for the Organization for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners claims responsibility.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

- Nov. 10—Results from yesterday's parliamentary elections give the ruling People's National Movement 26 of the 36 seats in Parliament.

TUNISIA

- Nov. 1—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held, the 1st multiparty elections in 25 years.
- Nov. 3—Interior Minister Driss Guiga announces that the ruling Destour Socialist party and its coalition partner, the Tunisian Trade Union Federation, won all 136 seats in the National Assembly. Opposition party leader Ahmed Mestiri, a former Defense Minister, accuses the Interior Minister of rigging the elections and falsifying the results.

TURKEY

- Nov. 3—A military court sentences former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to 4 months in jail for criticizing the government.
- Nov. 22—Leader of the military junta General Kenan Evren arrives in Islamabad, Pakistan, on his 1st visit outside the country since the junta assumed power 14 months ago.

U.S.S.R.(See also *Intl, Arms Control; Sweden; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Nov. 16—President Leonid I. Brezhnev tells the Central Committee that, for the 3d consecutive year, drought has caused "great harm to agriculture and hence to the entire economy."
- Nov. 17—Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai K. Baibakov presents the 1981-1985 five year plan to the legislature for approval.
- Nov. 20—In response to U.S. President Reagan's proposals to reduce the number of nuclear missiles in Europe, the Soviet embassy releases the contents of President Brezhnev's May 25 letter to President Reagan, in which Brezhnev urged that the 2 leaders confer.
- Central Committee member Vadim V. Zagladin welcomes President Reagan's recent proposal as a "turn for the better."
- Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Osipov and West German Ruhrgas chairman Klaus Liesen sign an agreement in which Ruhrgas will purchase more than 300 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually from the U.S.S.R., beginning in 1984.
- Nov. 22—Soviet President Brezhnev arrives in Bonn for 3 days of talks with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on reducing the nuclear arsenal in Europe.
- Nov. 25—At the conclusion of talks in West Germany, President Brezhnev and Chancellor Schmidt issue a joint communiqué; they agree to Soviet-West German con-

sultation on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

- Nov. 6—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher meets with Ireland's Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald; they agree to establish a joint "intergovernmental council" to further relations between the 2 countries.
- Nov. 16—Parliament expels 3 Protestant members from Northern Ireland, including Reverend Ian Paisley, for disrupting the session with abusive language.
- Nov. 23—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announces proposals to curb the power of trade unions.
- Nov. 25—Lord Scarman submits his report to the government on the causes of the rioting last summer in the Brixton section of south London. His report says the riots were not race riots but were the response of angry young blacks toward the police.
- Nov. 27—In a parliamentary by-election in Liverpool suburbs, Social Democratic candidate Shirley Williams wins the new party's first seat in the House of Commons; she defeats the Conservative party candidate by 5,000 votes.

Northern Ireland

- Nov. 14—In Belfast, member of Parliament Robert J. Bradford is shot and killed in a Belfast community center by 3 gunmen. A caretaker of the community center, Ken Campbell, is also killed. The Irish Republican Army claims responsibility for the attack.
- Nov. 18—The British government sends 600 more soldiers into Northern Ireland, bringing total British troop strength there to over 11,000.

UNITED STATES**Administration**

- Nov. 3—Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. says that a top White House aide has been "running a guerrilla campaign" against him for nine months.
- Nov. 5—Chief economist of the Office of Management and Budget Lawrence A. Kudlow details President Ronald Reagan's orders to federal agencies to cut \$16 billion in federal loan guarantees for home purchases and to cut an additional \$7.3 billion in loans for small businesses, rural development, exports, merchant ships and railroad rehabilitation by September 30, 1982.
- President Reagan meets with Haig and national security adviser Richard Allen and orders them to end their feuding.
- Nov. 6—Meeting with Republican congressional leaders, President Reagan says he has given up his plan to balance the federal budget by 1984.
- In a statement issued by the White House, President Reagan urges Congress to pass a 10-year extension of the Voting Rights Act with some modification.
- Nov. 9—Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan says that the administration has abandoned its proposal to raise \$3 billion in additional tax revenues for fiscal 1982.
- Nov. 10—In New York, U.S. district court Judge Charles Stewart Jr. files a new decision stating that because of new information a trial must be held to determine Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William J. Casey's part in each specific "alleged inaccuracy" in an investment-offering circular. The circular was published by Multiponics, Inc., an agribusiness company that subsequently declared bankruptcy. In an earlier decision,

the judge ruled that Casey, as an officer and a director of the company, had knowingly participated in an investment offering that "omitted and misrepresented facts."

Nov. 11—An article in the *Atlantic Monthly* quotes Office of Management and Budget director David Stockman as saying that he knew fiscal 1982 budget deficits would be higher than estimated, that the budget cuts are inequitable and that the military budget must be cut.

Nov. 12—Stockman apologizes and offers his resignation to President Reagan, who refuses to accept it; Stockman says he believes "in the President and his policies."

It is reported that on September 1 and November 1 the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management issued 3 leases to 2 oil companies for land adjacent to and in the Capitan Wilderness area of New Mexico; this is the 1st time the bureau has permitted oil exploration in a wilderness area.

Nov. 13—Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. announces that President Reagan has ordered 82-year-old Admiral Hyman G. Rickover to retire as head of the U.S. Navy's nuclear program.

White House deputy press secretary Larry Speakes says that the Justice Department is investigating a \$1,000 cash payment accepted by national security adviser Richard V. Allen on January 21 after he allegedly arranged an interview for a Japanese magazine, *Shufu-no-tomo*, with Nancy Reagan; Allen says he put the money in a safe in his office and forgot about it.

Nov. 16—President Ronald Reagan names Clarence M. Pendleton, president of the San Diego Urban League, as chairman of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, replacing Arthur S. Fleming, whom he fired.

Nov. 17—President Reagan nominates California lawyer Alan C. Nelson as Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

Nov. 19—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission suspends the license of California's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant until the plant passes seismic tests.

Nov. 21—In a White House interview, President Reagan says he is determined to cut federal aid programs to "take the country back as far as the Constitution."

Nov. 23—Because stopgap funding has expired, President Reagan orders nonessential federal workers to leave work and curtails some government services, in order to pressure Congress to cut fiscal 1982 spending further. (See *Congress*.)

Nov. 24—Federal employees return to work.

Nov. 29—National security adviser Richard Allen announces that he is taking a leave of absence, effective today, until an FBI investigation of his receipt of \$1,000 in cash from a Japanese magazine is completed.

Civil Rights

Nov. 12—Assistant Attorney General for civil rights William B. Reynolds tells a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee that the Justice Department will no longer try to desegregate an entire school district if only part of the district is segregated and will "seek to limit the remedy only to those schools in which racial imbalance is [intentional]"

Economy

Nov. 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 8 percent in October, the highest level in some 6 years.

Nov. 10—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.6 percent in October.

Nov. 16—The Federal Reserve stops charging a 2 per-

centage point surcharge against frequent large borrowers.

Nov. 19—The Commerce Department issues a revised figure for the gross national product (GNP) for the 3d quarter of 1981 showing an increase of 0.6 percent in the annual rate.

Nov. 24—Chase Manhattan Bank lowers its prime rate to 15.75 percent; other large banks lower their prime rate to 16 percent.

The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.4 percent in October.

Nov. 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators declined 1.8 percent in October.

The Commerce Department reports that the nation's foreign trade deficit was \$5.3 billion in October.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Arms Control, Middle East; China; El Salvador; Libya; Nicaragua; U.S.S.R.; Venezuela; Zaire*)

Nov. 2—In Washington, D.C., President Reagan meets with Jordan's King Hussein and urges him to cooperate to seek peace in the Middle East along the lines of the U.S.-sponsored Camp David accord. Hussein tells reporters, later, that he considers Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's 8-point plan "worthy of consideration."

Nov. 4—Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. tells the committee that "there are contingency plans in the NATO doctrine [sic] to fire a nuclear weapon for demonstrative purposes."

The State Department issues a memorandum supporting a strong and evenhanded U.S. human rights policy around the world to counter Soviet policy.

Nov. 5—Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that NATO has no plans for a demonstrative nuclear explosion as a warning to the Soviets.

Nov. 9—The first American troops arrive in Egypt for the 3-week "Bright Star" military exercise with Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and Oman.

Nov. 16—Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan meets with Chinese officials in Beijing at the 2d annual meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee.

Nov. 18—In his first major foreign policy address, broadcast live in the U.S. and Europe, President Reagan offers to cancel the U.S. deployment of Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles in West Europe if the Soviet Union will dismantle its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles aimed at West Europe. He says he has written to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev suggesting a 4-point arms reduction agenda.

Labor and Industry

Nov. 16—The AFL-CIO opens its 14th biennial convention in New York; the Reagan administration's economic and labor policies are strongly attacked.

Legislation

Nov. 16—The Senate votes 68 to 24 to confirm pediatric surgeon C. Everett Koop as U.S. Surgeon General and director of the Public Health Service.

Nov. 20—House and Senate negotiators fail to agree on a stopgap appropriations bill for fiscal 1982; stopgap funding expires at midnight.

Nov. 22—Both houses of Congress approve a \$428-billion stopgap spending bill that does not include all the spending cuts demanded by the President.

Nov. 23—President Reagan exercises the veto for the 1st time, vetoing the \$428-billion stopgap spending resolution passed by Congress yesterday because it exceeds the President's budget guidelines.

The House votes 221 to 176 and the Senate votes 88 to 1 to approve an extension of government financing at the present level until December 15.

President Reagan signs the measure.

Military

Nov. 11—The 1st Trident submarine, the *U.S.S. Ohio*, is commissioned; the vessel has a 4,000-mile range and carries 24 nuclear missiles.

Politics

Nov. 14—The Federal Election Commission reports that the 16 leading presidential contenders in the 1980 election spent some \$129.1 million on their campaigns; candidate Ronald Reagan spent \$26.7 million, and President Carter spent \$18.5 million.

Science and Space

Nov. 12—The space shuttle *Columbia* is launched from Cape Canaveral for a 2d trip into space.

Nov. 14—The space shuttle *Columbia* lands safely at Edwards Air Force Base after its projected 5-day flight is cut short because of the failure of one of its three fuel cells.

VENEZUELA

Nov. 17—In Washington, D.C., President Luis Herrera Campíns meets with U.S. President Ronald Reagan; Herrera continues to insist that Central America's difficulties cannot be resolved by military intervention.

ZAIRE

Nov. 30—In Washington, D.C., President Mobutu Sese Seko meets with U.S. officials; a spokesman for the White House confirms reports that U.S. military and economic aid to Zaire for the current year will be increased by \$14 million to \$45 million. ■

UNITED STATES POLICY

(Continued from page 42)


rulers of Saudi Arabia. It is not at all clear that the Saudis demanded any such action, just as the announced Greek intention of granting diplomatic status to the PLO was not occasioned by explicit pressure. The PLO itself cannot do very much for Greece in its dispute with Turkey, nor can it guarantee Saudi oil for Japan. In fact, none of the Arab states will be inclined to pay a high price for recognition of the Palestinian movement. On the other hand, these are low-cost gestures for the countries in question, intended to acquire some goodwill while demonstrating that they are not simply following the Washington foreign policy line. As a consequence, their policies put greater pressure on Washington to deal with the PLO and accord it some form of recognition.

Some United States officials have apparently long felt that talks with the PLO would be useful, and it is hard to believe that the statements made by former Presidents Gerald Ford and Carter just after the

Sadat funeral were not encouraged by the Reagan administration. It is likely that the Reagan government is seeking a formula that would provide for the redemption of the United States promise to Israel that the PLO would not be recognized until it first recognizes Israel's right to exist. In a quickly retracted comment on the Fahd plan, Arafat hinted at a device he might prefer, praising the plan because it provided for the coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian state. Perhaps he meant coexistence without either political or diplomatic recognition.

The Iranian revolution frightened the Saudis much more than it did the United States. Coming on the heels of the Camp David agreements in September, 1978, and March, 1979, it called Saudi Arabia's Islamic legitimacy into question just when Riyadh's Arab nationalism was tainted by its close association with President Sadat. Saudi leaders realized that they had to act swiftly and decisively to preserve their regime and their wealth, and they have done so with vigor and increasing success. At the summit meeting of the Islamic Congress in Taif in February, 1981, the Saudis won support for their ambiguous positions on Iran and Afghanistan, while diverting Islamic opinion to the issues of Jerusalem and Palestine. Arafat was given great personal support and the Islamic revolution was subordinated to the control of the Islamic holy places. Saudi Arabia resisted American pressure to acquire Saudi military bases and still persuaded the United States to sell it advanced weapons. In addition, Saudi Arabia has refused to support the Camp David agreements, and it has persuaded the United States to relegate support for Egypt to at best a secondary position. At the last OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) meeting, the Saudis finally succeeded in imposing their price on their cartel partners and have thus cut back on their oil production, possibly increasing their economic leverage over their industrialized customers.

Saudi policy has been both skillful and successful in exploiting the Iran-Iraq war, the Camp David stalemate, the crisis in Lebanon, and American anxiety over Soviet intentions in the Middle East. The combination of Saudi political skills and American military power appears formidable, even unchallengeable at the moment. The pragmatic possibilities of such collaboration have convinced American policymakers to subordinate their emphasis on the Soviet Union and to deal with regional problems first. This change in priorities is probably all to the good, but the pragmatic American path has rendered United States policy hostage to Saudi prudence and persuasiveness. It is unlikely that Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, not to mention Libya, South Yemen, the PLO and Iran, will readily agree that what is good for Saudi Arabia is good for the Middle East. ■



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